Delegational Delusions: Why Judges Should Be Able To Delegate Reasonable Authority Over Stated Supervised Release Conditions by Schraa, Eugenia
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 38
Number 3 Cooper-Walsh Colloquium - Surveying the
Damage: An Assessment of Legal and Policy Responses
to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Article 11
2011
Delegational Delusions: Why Judges Should Be
Able To Delegate Reasonable Authority Over
Stated Supervised Release Conditions
Eugenia Schraa
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eugenia Schraa, Delegational Delusions: Why Judges Should Be Able To Delegate Reasonable Authority Over Stated Supervised Release
Conditions, 38 Fordham Urb. L.J. 899 (2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol38/iss3/11
Delegational Delusions: Why Judges Should Be Able To Delegate
Reasonable Authority Over Stated Supervised Release Conditions
Cover Page Footnote
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Harvard College, 2004. I dedicate this Note to
my father, David Schraa. On this project, as on so many others, he steered me away from pitfalls of the “Fn 85,
please check with Bob” sort, and provided the encouragement that allowed me to succeed. Thank you to Judge
Dora L. Irizarry, whose dedication to helping defendants on supervised release in the Eastern District of New
York gain control of their lives ignited my interest in the subject, and led to this Note. Kelly O’Keefe, Head of
Probation, also in the Eastern District, provided resources and insights that significantly strengthened this
Note. Professor John Pfaff provided the perfect combination of guidance, space, and genuine interest. Lynda
Garcia both encouraged me before my Note landed on her desk, and provided brilliant editing thereafter. I
owe a debt to Professor Larry Abraham, who located lost sources, literally saving portions of this paper.
Finally, thanks to team Garcia: Tricia Walsh, a true friend, Jere Keyes, Haley Plourde-Cole, Rob Meyerhoff,
Jessica Berkey, Brett Clements, and Tavish DeAtley. And to team Schraa: my mentor, Mary Pennisi, my aunt,
Marian Young, my brother, Anthony D’Souza, and the man I love, Ming-Tai Huh.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol38/iss3/11
SCHRAA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011 8:20 PM 
 
899 
DELEGATIONAL DELUSIONS: WHY JUDGES 
SHOULD BE ABLE TO DELEGATE REASONABLE 
AUTHORITY OVER STATED SUPERVISED 
RELEASE CONDITIONS 
Eugenia Schraa∗ 
Introduction ............................................................................................... 901 
  I.  Background ......................................................................................... 903 
A. Article III: Judicial Impartiality ............................................... 903 
1. Delegation: An “Essential Attribute” of the 
Administrative State .......................................................... 905 
2. Punishment: Deference to Prison Authorities .................... 909 
B. Supervised Release and the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 ......................................................................................... 911 
1. Sentencing and Parole Before the Act: “Unfettered 
Discretion” ......................................................................... 912 
2. Congress’ Intent: Rehabilitation’s Tenuous Hold .............. 915 
3. In Practice: Costly and Ineffective ..................................... 923 
C. The Supervised Release Statute ............................................... 927 
1. Imposing Conditions .......................................................... 927 
2. The Right to Appeal ........................................................... 929 
3. Termination, Modification, and Revocation ...................... 929 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Harvard College, 2004.  I 
dedicate this Note to my father, David Schraa.  On this project, as on so many others, he 
steered me away from pitfalls of the “Fn 85, please check with Bob” sort, and provided the 
encouragement that allowed me to succeed. 
  Thank you to Judge Dora L. Irizarry, whose dedication to helping defendants on su-
pervised release in the Eastern District of New York gain control of their lives ignited my 
interest in the subject, and led to this Note.  Kelly O’Keefe, Head of Probation, also in the 
Eastern District, provided resources and insights that significantly strengthened this Note. 
  Professor John Pfaff provided the perfect combination of guidance, space, and ge-
nuine interest.  Lynda Garcia both encouraged me before my Note landed on her desk, and 
provided brilliant editing thereafter.  I owe a debt to Professor Larry Abraham, who located 
lost sources, literally saving portions of this paper. 
  Finally, thanks to team Garcia: Tricia Walsh, a true friend, Jere Keyes, Haley 
Plourde-Cole, Rob Meyerhoff, Jessica Berkey, Brett Clements, and Tavish DeAtley.  And to 
team Schraa: my mentor, Mary Pennisi, my aunt, Marian Young, my brother, Anthony 
D’Souza, and the man I love, Ming-Tai Huh. 
SCHRAA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
900 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
4. Probation Officers’ Duties ................................................. 930 
  II.  Conflict .............................................................................................. 930 
A. The Majority Approach: Article III Literalism ........................ 936 
1. The Ultimate Responsibility Rule: United States v. 
Johnson .............................................................................. 936 
2. Policy Implications: United States v. Heath and United 
States v. Stephens ............................................................... 939 
a. Heath Facts: Leeway, But Only So Much ................... 940 
b. Heath Holding: An Impermissibly Ambivalent 
Sentence ...................................................................... 941 
c. Narrow Tailoring and United States v. Stephens ......... 942 
i. Stephens Facts: A Struggle With Drug Use .......... 943 
ii. Stephens Holding: A Struggle to Find the 
Limiting Principle ................................................. 944 
3. Protecting Defendants’ Rights: United States v. Pruden ... 945 
a. Facts: An Extraneous Condition ................................. 945 
b. Holding: Two Legal Reasons to Strike the 
Condition ..................................................................... 946 
B. The Minority Pragmatic Approach .......................................... 947 
1. Recasting United States v. Johnson’s “Ultimate 
Responsibility” .................................................................. 948 
2. Policy Rationale: Delegation Limiting Supervised 
Release Conditions ............................................................ 949 
  III.  Resolution ......................................................................................... 950 
A. Constitutional Reasons to Delegate ......................................... 950 
1. Literally Constitutional ...................................................... 950 
2. In the Pipeline .................................................................... 952 
a. Plurality ....................................................................... 952 
b. Dissent ......................................................................... 953 
3. The Judicial Probation Officer and the Executive 
Prison Authority ................................................................. 954 
B. Policy Reasons to Delegate ..................................................... 955 
1. The Original Goals of Supervised Release ........................ 956 
a. A Sentence With No Surprises .................................... 956 
b. Removing the Strategy from Sentencing..................... 958 
c. Rehabilitation .............................................................. 960 
2. Critiques of Supervised Release ........................................ 960 
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 961 
SCHRAA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
2011] DELEGATIONAL DELUSIONS 901 
INTRODUCTION 
Presiding over a sentencing hearing in 2005, a federal judge faced a di-
lemma.1  He had sentenced Lawrence Bowman to three years in prison for 
possession of child pornography.2  He had also sentenced Bowman to three 
years of supervised release,3 which would require Bowman to report to a 
probation officer and abide by certain conditions upon his release from 
prison.4 
But the particulars of the case presented the judge with a difficult choice: 
because Bowman had a ten year-old son and a young grandson, the judge 
was worried about whether they could safely spend time with Bowman 
when he returned from prison.5  On the other hand, the judge recognized 
that a psychologist had concluded that Bowman did not have sexual proc-
livities that would endanger young children.6  Therefore, he did not want to 
impose a condition that would cruelly punish not only Bowman, but also 
his family by keeping them separated unless it was truly necessary.7  The 
judge stated that, even though Bowman did not appear to pose a risk at the 
time of sentencing, he did not want to allow Bowman to see his son and 
grandson unsupervised “without having input from the counselors . . . and 
from the probation officer who knows the matter best.”8 
At the suggestion of Bowman’s probation officer who spoke at the hear-
ing, the judge resolved this dilemma by making the supervision require-
ment a condition of Bowman’s supervised release, but adding that his pro-
bation officer could relieve him of the condition if, after consulting with his 
sex offender treatment provider, she determined that he was not a threat.9 
Most appellate courts, however, would not permit this solution.10 
The majority of circuit courts hold that allowing a probation officer to 
decide whether or not to impose a particular condition of supervised re-
 
 1. See United States v. Bowman, 175 F. App’x 834, 837-38 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 2. Id. at 836. 
 3. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Bowman, 175 F. App’x 834 (No. 05-30106), 2005 
WL 2704004, at *1. 
 4. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) (containing main provisions of the supervised release 
statute). 
 5. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 3, at *18. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id.  In his sentencing memorandum, Bowman contended that he had a “stable 
home life,” had been married to the same woman for over thirty years, and that his four 
children were supportive of him “as evident [sic] from their letters and their appearance in 
court.” See id. at *9-10. 
 8. Id. at *19. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra note 193 (collecting cases). 
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lease—depending on that officer’s assessment of the defendant’s needs—
violates the Constitution.11  These courts hold that imposing a sentence is 
an exclusively judicial task, and that conditions of supervised release are 
part of a sentence.12  Because Article III of the Constitution requires that 
federal judges enjoy life tenure and guaranteed salaries,13 these courts hold 
that probation officers, who do not enjoy those protections,14 cannot exer-
cise authority to determine whether or not to impose a stated supervised re-
lease condition,15 such as needing supervision to spend time with a son and 
grandson. 
However, Bowman’s sentencing judge happened to sit in one of only 
two circuits that have upheld the kind of delegation he employed.16  Had 
the sentencing judge sat in one of the majority circuits, he would in all like-
lihood have imposed the supervision condition on Bowman without allow-
ing Bowman’s probation officer to relieve him of the burden of needing an 
officer to be present when spending time with his son and grandson.  Pre-
sumably, most judges would err on the side of safety in such situations, 
even to the detriment of the defendant.  In a majority circuit, therefore, 
Bowman would either have had to abide by the condition, or go through the 
expense of petitioning for another hearing in hopes of having the condition 
removed.17 
This Note examines the split in federal circuit courts over whether sen-
tencing judges may delegate to probation officers the decision to imple-
ment specified conditions of a defendant’s term of supervised release.  Part 
 
 11. For an analysis of the constitutional basis of the majority approach, see infra Part 
II.A. 
 12. These courts frequently cite Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41 (1916), for the 
proposition that “the right to try offenses against the criminal laws, and, upon conviction, to 
impose the punishment provided by law, is judicial.”  For an analysis of the way the majori-
ty approach uses that case, see infra Part II.A.1.  For a discussion of the limits on the judi-
ciary’s authority over punishment in Supreme Court jurisprudence, see infra Part I.A.2. 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
delegation to non-Article III officers, see infra Part I.A.1.  For a discussion of the majority’s 
analysis of this jurisprudence, see infra Part II.A.1. 
 14. See 18 U.S.C. § 3602(a) (2006) (“A district court of the United States shall appoint 
qualified persons to serve . . . as probation officers within the jurisdiction and under the di-
rection of the court making the appointment.  The court may, for cause, remove a probation 
officer appointed to serve with compensation, and may, in its discretion, remove a probation 
officer appointed to serve without compensation.”). 
 15. See infra notes 217, 231-234 and accompanying text. 
 16. These are the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits.  The Ninth produced Bowman. See infra 
note 1900 and accompanying text. 
 17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (providing that a judge must hold a hearing to impose sanc-
tions for violations of supervised release conditions); id. § 3742(a)(3), (b)(3) (giving defen-
dants and the government, respectively, the right to appeal conditions of supervised release 
to the district court). 
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I.A examines the original intent behind Article III, the long history of dele-
gation of judicial functions to non-Article III officers, and the deference 
that the judiciary must give to the executive branch in the realm of punish-
ment.  Part I.B traces the history of supervised release, the scheme that re-
placed parole in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984’s overhaul of federal 
sentencing rules.  Part I.C discusses the major components of the super-
vised release statute. 
Part II examines the split in federal authority.  Part II.A focuses on the 
majority of circuits that hold delegation impermissible on constitutional 
grounds, and explores a seeming tension between the Article III values that 
the majority approach purports to protect and the actual facts in those cases.  
Part II.B examines the reasoning of the minority of circuits that, adopting a 
more pragmatic approach, condone judicial delegation of supervised re-
lease conditions that the sentencing judge has specified.  Part III advocates 
for the adoption of the pragmatic approach on constitutional and policy 
grounds. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Part I.A provides an overview of judicial delegation to non-life-tenured 
officers under Article III.  The majority approach relies on Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of non-Article III tribunals.18  
Part I.A.1 explores this jurisprudence, and Part I.A.2 explores the relation-
ship between the judiciary’s right to impose criminal punishment—also an 
important basis for the majority approach—and its obligation to defer to the 
executive branch on some punitive matters.  Finally, Parts I.B and I.C 
briefly trace the history and development of the federal supervised release 
system. 
A. Article III: Judicial Impartiality 
The Supreme Court has guarded Article III’s mandate that federal judges 
enjoy life tenure and receive undiminished compensation19 so jealously 
that, in 1982, it struck down the entire Bankruptcy Court system as uncons-
titutional.20  The Court believed that the amount of judicial power bank-
 
 18. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 20. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  The Court 
noted that the Constitution “commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously 
guarded.” Id. at 60. 
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ruptcy judges, who serve finite terms,21 were able to wield infringed on Ar-
ticle III.22 
The historical record indicates that the framers considered Article III’s 
requirement that federal judges enjoy life tenure and undiminished com-
pensation a “guarantee of judicial impartiality.”23  For example, the Decla-
ration of Independence denounced King George III for having “made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the 
amount and payment of their salaries.”24  A decade later, the Constitutional 
Convention defeated a proposal to give the executive and legislative 
branches power to remove judges.25  Advocating for ratification in the Fe-
deralist Papers, Alexander Hamilton wrote: “Next to permanency in office, 
nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed 
provision for their support.”26 
 
 21. Definite terms violate Article III’s guarantee of judicial impartiality. United States 
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (stating that the “good Behaviour” Clause 
guarantees that Article III judges enjoy life tenure, subject only to removal by impeach-
ment); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
  Today, bankruptcy judges remain non-Article III officers.  First, they serve fourteen-
year terms and the judicial council of the circuit in which they serve may still remove them 
for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or disability, exactly as was true in Northern 
Pipeline. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1), (e) (2006), with N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. 
at 53 (describing the elements of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 that made bankruptcy judges 
non-Article III officers).  Second, their salaries are still set by statute, as they were in North-
ern Pipeline, at ninety-two percent of district court judges’ salaries. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 
153(a), with N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 53 (“[T]he salaries of the bankruptcy 
judges are set by statute and are subject to adjustment under the Federal Salary Act.”). 
 22. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 52. 
 23. Id. at 58.  The guarantees also served additional purposes, such as promoting “public 
confidence in judicial determinations,” id. at 59 n.10 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 300 
(Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1988)), helping to attract well-qualified professionals 
to the federal bench, id., and promoting judicial individualism. Id.; Irving R. Kaufman, 
Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 713 (1979) (separation of powers is “es-
sential to protect the independence of the individual judge, even from incursions by other 
judges”). 
 24. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776). 
 25. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 59 n.11; 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, at 428-29 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter 2 Farrand]; see also RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 7 (5th ed. 2003 & supp. 2008).  A Pennsylvania delegate commented: “The Judges 
would be in a bad situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which might prevail 
in the two branches of our Govt.” 2 Farrand, supra, at 429. 
 26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 23, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton).  Hamilton 
continued: “In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence 
amounts to a power over his will.” Id. 
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1. Delegation: An “Essential Attribute” of the Administrative State 
Nonetheless, Congress delegated judicial authority to non-Article III 
judges in its very first session.27  It vested in executive officers the power 
to resolve issues such as claims to veterans’ benefits,28 and authorized 
commissioned officers to preside over courts martial in military tribunals.29  
The Supreme Court approved these schemes from the start.  In 1828, Chief 
Justice Marshall upheld Congress’ use of non-Article III federal tribunals 
to adjudicate disputes in the federal territories,30 setting an enduring 
precedent of “legislative courts”—non-Article III adjudicative bodies 
created by Congress.31 
Today, non-Article III judges shoulder a larger proportion of the federal 
docket than do life-tenured judges.32  Primarily, this proliferation stems 
from the demands of the modern administrative state.33 
 
 27. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 919-20 (1988) [hereinafter Fallon, Legislative]. 
 28. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95.  The first congressional session also 
allowed executive officers to resolve controversies surrounding customs duties. See Act of 
July 20, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29; Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55. 
 29. See David P. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REV. 
129, 150 (1980). 
 30. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
 31. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 (1982) 
(acknowledging three exceptions to the “literal command” of Article III, § 1, which “must 
be interpreted in light of the historical context in which the Constitution was written,” while 
otherwise holding that that literal reading must prevail); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 
(1932) (upholding administrative agency’s power to resolve disputes, and placing it within 
the tradition of other Article I courts); Fallon, Legislative, supra note 27, at 921. See gener-
ally MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL 
POWER 37-53 (1980) (detailing the history of legislative courts). 
 32. Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative 
Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2605 (1998) [hereinafter, Resnik, The 
Federal Courts].  The application of federal law would be impossible today without non-
Article III judges, barring a significant increase in the judiciary. Id. 
 33. Fallon, Legislative, supra note 27, at 925. See generally Cass Sunstein, Constitutio-
nalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987) (describing the New Deal origins 
of the modern administrative agency). 
  Besides the demands of the modern administrative state, however, there is at least 
one other contributor to the Supreme Court’s approval of congressional schemes that dele-
gate some judicial functions: maintaining the prestige of the federal bench.  Article III 
judges tend to lobby for a small, life-tenured judiciary, reasoning that one too large would 
threaten the elite status that is necessary to lure first-rate lawyers to the bench. See, e.g., 
Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts (Dec. 
1995), at 98 (1996) (recommendation 15) (titled, “The growth of the Article III judiciary 
should be carefully controlled so that the creation of new judgeships, while not subject to a 
numerical ceiling, is limited to that number necessary to exercise federal court jurisdic-
tion”); see also FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 384-85 (describing Chief Justice War-
ren Burger’s “aggressive lobbying effort” to prevent the conferral of Article III status on 
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In 1932, the Supreme Court first approved the adjudication of private 
rights by an administrative agency in Crowell v. Benson.34  Crowell held 
that Article I tribunals are constitutional so long as the “essential attributes” 
of the decision remain in an Article III court.35  That is, so long as the Ar-
ticle I court functions more as an adjunct of the federal court than as an in-
dependent tribunal.36  Crowell noted that, even traditionally, officers other 
than judges can determine some of the facts in a case, so long as judges 
make the final decisions.  For example, masters37—even without the par-
ties’ consent—have long made advisory findings of fact by which the par-
ties must abide if the judge accepts them.38  Crowell found that the district 
court’s ability to review the agency’s findings of law and fact de novo, that 
is, anew, satisfied the essential attributes standard,39 although the dissent 
would have insisted upon allowing de novo trials.40 
In the late 1960s, Congress began delegating federal adjudicatory pow-
ers to magistrates,41 who serve eight-year renewable terms.42  Citing Cro-
 
bankruptcy judges); Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The 
Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 
7-12 (1985); Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doctrine of Article 
III Duty; Or Why the Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status Rules are (Profoundly) Un-
constitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 955, 1011 (2009); Resnik, The Federal Courts, 
supra note 32, at 2594. 
  Ironically, the bankruptcy court system struck down by Northern Pipeline did not 
feature life-tenured judges in large part because Chief Justice Burger, as head of the United 
States Judicial Conference, had lobbied against conferring Article III status on bankruptcy 
judges. See FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 25, at 384-85; Eric A. Posner, The Political 
Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 74-94 (1996).  At the 
same time, however, these same judges tend to demand help in managing their caseload. 
Resnik, The Federal Courts, supra note 32, at 2605. 
 34. 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (upholding Congress’ vesting of responsibility for deciding cas-
es under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act in the United States 
Employee Compensation Commission). 
 35. Id. at 51. 
 36. Id. at 50-51. 
 37. A master is a “parajudicial” officer that helps a court with its proceedings by taking 
testimony, hearing and ruling on discovery disputes, entering temporary orders, and han-
dling other pretrial matters, as well as computing interest, valuing annuities, investigating 
encumbrances on land titles, and the like. BLACK LAW’S DICTIONARY 408 (9th ed. 2009); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (providing rules for proceedings led by masters). 
 38. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 52. 
 39. Id. at 62-63; see also Fallon, Legislative, supra note 27, at 925 (“Anticipating the 
vital role of administrative adjudication, Crowell sought to preserve the role of the [A]rticle 
III courts not by excluding agencies from adjudication altogether, but by requiring de novo 
judicial review of the most important agency decisions.”). 
 40. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 66 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 41. The Magistrate Judges’ Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107, codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631 (2006), and 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (2006); see also Judith 
Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1115 (2006) [hereinaf-
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well, the Supreme Court upheld the magistrate scheme in United States v. 
Raddatz,43 which held that “delegation does not violate Art. III so long as 
the ultimate decision is made by the district court.”44  Raddatz noted that 
Congress allowed magistrates only to hear certain pre-trial matters and to 
conduct hearings (and only to do so in the district court’s sole discretion),45 
and that district judges would review these decisions de novo.46  Based on 
these factors, the Court found that the magistrate statute met the ultimate 
decision test.47 
Two years after Raddatz, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co.,48 which struck down the bankruptcy system, seemed to 
indicate a reversal in the Court’s more permissive delegation jurisprudence.  
Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion49 reasoned that Congress’ creation of 
non-Article III bankruptcy judges—replacing a system in which “referees” 
conducted most bankruptcy proceedings as adjuncts of the district court—
threatened the separation of powers.50  Bankruptcy judges enjoyed “ple-
nary” jurisdiction, while referees only had jurisdiction “over controversies 
involving property in the actual or constructive possession of the court.”51  
Bankruptcy judges’ decisions were appealable, but only under a “clear er-
ror standard.”52 
Acknowledging that a literal interpretation of Article III was impossible, 
the plurality allowed a few narrow historical exceptions for legislative 
courts, such as military tribunals and administrative agencies (provided 
they acted as “adjuncts” to federal courts, which would retain the “essential 
 
ter Resnik, Whither] (describing the history of Congress’ delegation of judicial authority in 
the twentieth century). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 631(e).  District judges appoint magistrates. Id. § 631(a).  The president 
appoints Article III judges “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 43. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). 
 44. Id. at 683. 
 45. Id.  Today, magistrate judges can also preside over civil trials, if the parties consent. 
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
 46. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 682-83. 
 47. Id. at 683-84. 
 48. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 49. While no opinion in Northern Pipeline garnered a majority, the concurring justices, 
Rehnquist and O’Connor, agreed that Congress could not constitutionally confer jurisdiction 
on a non-Article III federal tribunal to decide a common law contract action. See N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. at 73-74 (plurality opinion). 
 51. Id. at 55 (plurality opinion). 
 52. Id. at 55 n.5 (plurality opinion). 
SCHRAA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
908 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
attributes of the judicial power”).53  However, the plurality held that the 
availability of appellate review to an Article III court alone was not enough 
to satisfy this standard.54 
Thus, allowing only narrow exceptions, the plurality insisted on a literal 
interpretation of Article III that, commentators criticized, was at odds with 
the momentum of the administrative state.55  This likely explains why cases 
subsequent to Northern Pipeline have followed Justice White’s more 
pragmatic dissent,56 which proposed a balancing test that weighs Article III 
“values” against the practical and constitutional arguments for non-Article 
III adjudication.57 
In a later case,58 the Supreme Court emphasized that the balancing test 
should be flexible,59 and outlined four factors to weigh: (1) the extent to 
which Congress reserves the “essential attributes” of judicial power to Ar-
ticle III courts through appellate review; (2) the extent to which the non-
Article III forum exercises powers normally vested in Article III courts; (3) 
the importance of the right to be adjudicated; and (4) the concerns that 
drove Congress to depart from Article III’s requirements.60 
For example, in another post-Northern Pipeline case, the Supreme Court 
upheld a scheme delegating the approval of certain Environmental Protec-
 
 53. Id. at 77 & n.29, 78, 81, 84, 87 (plurality opinion) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). 
 54. Id. at 86 n.39 (plurality opinion). 
 55. See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and the Northern 
Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 197; see also Fallon, Legislative, supra note 27, at 
927. 
 56. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 (1986) 
(upholding the Commodity Futures Tradition Commission’s exercise of jurisdiction over a 
state law cause of action, and reasoning that the congressional interest in providing for ad-
ministrative adjudication must be weighed against “the purposes underlying the require-
ments of Article III”); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) 
(upholding congressional scheme that permitted a federal arbitrator, subject to article III 
court review only for fraud or misconduct, to rule on compensation claims relating to the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s approval of pesticide registrations); see also Fallon, 
Legislative, supra note 27, at 929; Resnik, Whither, supra note 40, at 1115. 
 57. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 113-16 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court 
[need not] always defer to the legislative decision to create Art. I, rather than Art. III, courts. 
Article III is not to be read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as expressing 
one value that must be balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative re-
sponsibilities.”). 
 58. Schor, 478 U.S. 833. 
 59. Id. at 851.  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, stated that, while a more 
“formalistic” approach might “lend a greater degree of coherence to this area of the law,” it 
might also “unduly constrict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant 
to its Article I powers.” Id. 
 60. Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). 
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tion Agency claims to a non-Article III court because: (1) the scheme pro-
vided for an Article III court review—even though this review was limited 
only to findings of fraud or misconduct;61 (2) it approved of Congress’ rea-
sons for needing speedy administrative determinations;62 and (3) although 
not corresponding exactly to one of the four factors, it found that the 
scheme was inherently fair,63 which is the value that lies at the heart of Ar-
ticle III.64 
In sum, Article III literalism has never long prevailed in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  Northern Pipeline is a spectacular exception, showing lite-
ralism’s power to upset congressional schemes.  The post-Northern Pipe-
line approach, which prevails today, is not only more pragmatic, but, also 
more true to the real purpose—or “values,” as Justice White termed it—of 
Article III: assurance that litigants will obtain fair treatment from the feder-
al judiciary. 
2. Punishment: Deference to Prison Authorities 
Punishment exists at an uneasy intersection between the three branches 
of government.65  While Congress has the constitutional authority to define 
the punishments for the laws it creates66 and the judiciary the obligation to 
impose sentence,67 prisons are part of the executive branch’s domain.68  
The Supreme Court has held that “prison administrators . . . and not the 
courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional opera-
tions.”69  District courts must accord “deference to the judgment of the 
 
 61. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 591. 
 62. Id. at 592-93. 
 63. Id. (noting in particular the fact that both parties participated voluntarily). 
 64. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
 65. See, e.g., Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916) (“[T]he right to try of-
fenses against the criminal laws, and, upon conviction, to impose the punishment provided 
by law, is judicial, [but] the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legisla-
tive, . . . and the right to relieve from the punishment fixed by law . . . belongs to the execu-
tive department.”) (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. at 42. 
 67. Id. at 41. 
 68. The Bureau of Prisons operates as an agency of the United States Department of Jus-
tice. 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (2006) (stating that the Bureau of Prisons is subject to the authori-
ty of the Attorney General); 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.95 et seq., 500.1 (2011) (describing Bureau of 
Prisons’ place within United States Department of Justice hierarchy). 
“The Department of Justice is an executive department of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 
501 (2006).  The Attorney General heads the Justice Department, and is appointed by the 
president, by and with the consent of the Senate. Id. § 503. 
 69. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Un-
ion, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)); accord Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) 
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prison authorities” over prison regulations, including those that impinge on 
inmates’ constitutional rights.70 
Even when legislatures primarily view prison sentences as serving a pu-
nitive purpose—as opposed to deterring crime or rehabilitating offend-
ers71—prison officials have considerable discretion to determine the form 
of punishment.  For example, they can determine whether the prisoner must 
submit to solitary confinement.72  Thus, despite the judiciary’s right to im-
pose sentence, the executive branch, via its prisons, also has the right to 
impose more or less punitive measures against an offender. 
Similarly, the Bureau of Prisons has the sole discretion to decide where 
to place offenders.  For example, offenders may be sent to prison or a half-
way house.73  In making that decision, the Bureau relies on information 
about the offender’s criminal history, education, medical history, and sub-
stance abuse issues that it garners from the sentencing court and the Proba-
tion Office’s presentence report for each defendant.74  However, a sentenc-
 
(“Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of 
prison administration.”), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
 70. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361-62 (1996) (holding that prison whose lockdowns 
“routinely” forced inmates to experience delays in receiving legal assistance, in some cases 
lasting over two weeks, were not of constitutional significance, even where they resulted in 
actual injury, so long as they were the product of prison regulations reasonably related to 
penological interests).  For more examples of prison regulations that the Supreme Court has 
upheld, see infra note 72. 
 71. For a discussion of American theories of criminal justice and incarceration, see infra 
Part I.B.1. 
 72. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (holding prison officials have broad discre-
tion to segregate prisoners from the company of others for misconduct); see also Beard v. 
Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (upholding prison officials’ decision not to allow inmates read-
ing material in solitary confinement); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (holding that 
the Due Process Clause does not entitle a state prisoner to a hearing when prison officials 
transfer him or her to a prison whose conditions are substantially less favorable). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 
 74. Jennifer Borges, The Bureau of Prisons’ New Policy: A Misguided Attempt to Fur-
ther Restrict a Federal Judge’s Sentencing Discretion and to Get Tough on White-Collar 
Crime, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 141, 173 (2005).  In determining 
where to house offenders, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) dictates that the Bureau consider the follow-
ing factors: 
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated; 
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; 
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner; 
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence— 
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was de-
termined to be warranted; or 
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and 
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant 
to section 994(a)(2) of title 28. 
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ing court’s order as to the type of housing in which the defendant should 
serve his or her term of incarceration is not binding on the Bureau.75 
Parole76 and probation77 authorities have also played a role in the Amer-
ican corrections system.  Today, probation officers oversee federal offend-
ers on supervised release78 as adjuncts of the judicial branch—the district 
court appoints them and they serve under the court’s direction.79  Tradi-
tionally, however, the Parole Office was an executive agency, and had the 
authority, in most instances, to shorten the sentence that the trial judge had 
imposed, as discussed in Part I.B.1 below.  Thus, the judiciary has never 
had the exclusive right to impose a sentence on a criminal defendant, but 
has had to share that responsibility with the executive branch’s prison and 
parole authorities. 
B. Supervised Release and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
This Part traces the history of supervised release.  Part I.B.1 focuses on 
the rehabilitative ideal that initially led to the creation of the federal parole 
system, and of the coalition of forces on the political left and right that 
dismantled that system, finding fault with what they saw as its excessive 
discretion.  Part I.B.2 examines the conflicting ideas behind the supervised 
release system that replaced parole—in theory, the ideal of rehabilitation 
animates supervised release, but a punitive impulse has arguably dominated 
it in practice.  Part I.B.3 explores the dual failures of supervised release as 
 
Id.  The statute further dictates that “[t]he Bureau shall make available appropriate substance 
abuse treatment for each prisoner the Bureau determines has a treatable condition of sub-
stance addiction or abuse.” Id. 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).  The Bureau also has the discretion to decide whether to grant 
a prisoner temporary release under certain circumstances, such as to visit a dying relative or 
reestablish family ties. Id. § 3622. 
 76. Parole is conditional release from imprisonment before a prisoner has served his or 
her full sentence, usually granted for good behavior and on condition that the parolee regu-
larly report to a supervising officer for a specified period. BLACK LAW’S DICTIONARY 1227 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 77. Probation is a criminal sentence in its own right that replaces any jail or prison time, 
allowing the offender into the community on condition that he or she regularly report to a 
supervising officer for a specified period. Id. at 1322. 
 78. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 placed probation officers in charge of supervis-
ing offenders on supervised release, replacing parole officers who had formerly served that 
function. Hillard M. Sterling, Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United 
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1986-1987: Sentencing, Probation, and Pa-
role, 76 GEO. L.J. 1182, 1184 (1988); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3603(a) (listing probation offic-
ers’ duties).  For a discussion of probation officers’ duties, see infra notes 179-183 and ac-
companying text. 
 79. Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 25, 42 (2005) [hereinafter Luna, Gridland]; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3602(a). 
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instituted: its high financial costs and dismal recidivism statistics.  This 
Part also briefly looks at the role that probation officers play within the sys-
tem. 
1. Sentencing and Parole Before the Act: “Unfettered Discretion” 
From about 1870 to 1970, a rehabilitative ideal dominated the American 
model of punishment,80 which aimed to “cure” the offender of criminali-
ty.81  Thus, legislatures delegated wide sentencing discretion to judges,82 
customarily prescribing an array of sanctions for each crime from which 
the judge could choose the one best calculated to rehabilitate the defen-
dant.83  The sentencing decision was then largely immune from appeal.84 
 
 80. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court has Mangled 
American Sentencing Law and How it Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 370 
(2010) [hereinafter Bowman, Debacle] (stating that the rehabilitative model “emphasized 
individualized sentences, rehabilitation of offenders, and judicial and administrative discre-
tion”); Luna, Gridland, supra note 79 (stating that for “most of the previous century,” feder-
al sentencing “shap[ed] the sentence to the offender in order to ‘cure’ his ‘disease’ of crimi-
nality (or effectively quarantine him from lawful society)”); see also Sheldon Glueck, 
Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453, 455 (1928) (“Even a socially 
harmful criminal has a right, in justice, to be treated with those instrumentalities that give 
him the greatest promise of self-improvement and rehabilitation.”); Ilene H. Nagel, Structur-
ing Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRI-
MINOLOGY 883, 893 (1990) (stating that the primary purpose of incarceration in American 
shifted in 1870 from one concerned with “retribution and punishment” to rehabilitative 
theory). 
 81. In 1870, for example, the National Congress of Prisons issued a Declaration of Prin-
ciples that stated: Crime is “a moral disease, of which punishment is the remedy. . . . The 
supreme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals and not the infliction of 
vindictive suffering.” Nagel, supra note 79 (quoting AM. CORR. ASS’N, TRANSACTIONS OF 
THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF PRISONS AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE (1870)); see also Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (discussing “[t]oday’s philosophy of indivi-
dualizing sentences”); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 
51, 55 (1937) (“For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration 
of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken 
into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of 
the offender.”); PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND REALITY 
OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 11 (1991) (discussing the rise of the rehabilitative “juggernaut” be-
tween 1877 and 1970 and noting that a “medical analogue was frequently invoked”); Nancy 
Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons from Criminal Trials and 
Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 421 (1999) (“Like a social worker or doctor, the 
judge exercised his or her clinical judgment to arrive at a sentence.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 80 (“Concomitant with the theories of prison as a reha-
bilitative institution . . . was the development of the then innovative indeterminate sen-
tence.”); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of the Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993) (“From the 
beginning of the Republic, federal judges were entrusted with wide sentencing discretion.”). 
 83. Bowman, Debacle, supra note 80 (noting that legislatures set ranges of possible 
fines as well as of restrictions on the convict’s liberty). 
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In keeping with the rehabilitative ethos, Congress introduced parole into 
the federal system in 1910.85  Each federal prison had a parole board, 
which had the statutory power to release any prisoner who had served one-
third of his or her stated sentence, if the board was satisfied that “there is a 
reasonable probability that [the prisoner] will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the laws,” and that release “is not incompatible with the 
welfare of society.”86  In all, the length of time that the prisoner served de-
pended on the discretion both of the judge, at the front end, and the Parole 
Office, at the back, within the limits set by the legislature.87 
 
 84. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (“Before the Guidelines 
system, a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not 
reviewable on appeal.”); Freeman v. United States, 243 F. 353 (9th Cir. 1917) (holding that 
the nature of the sentence imposed is within sole discretion of the trial court and not review-
able if within the statutory maximum); Bowman, Debacle supra note 80, at 370-71 (“The 
judge’s choice of sentence within the statutory parameters for the crime(s) of conviction was 
largely unconstrained by . . . appellate review.”); Luna, Gridland, supra note 79, at 42-43 
(“Trial judges did not have to offer reasons for any particular sentence, their decisions were 
largely immune from appeal.”); Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 226 & n.8 (noting that there 
was a brief period, following the 1891 creation of the federal circuit courts, when federal 
criminal sentences were reviewable, but that “ultimately the view prevailed that Congress 
had repealed such authority”). 
 85. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819 (creating parole boards at each United 
States federal penitentiary) (repealed); Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938) (“Parole 
is intended to be a means of restoring offenders who are good social risks to society; to af-
ford the unfortunate another opportunity by clemency—under guidance and control of the 
Board.”); United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928) (“The parole statute provides a 
board to be invested with full opportunity to watch the conduct of penitentiary convicts dur-
ing their incarceration, and to shorten it.”); PETER B. HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL 
PAROLE SYSTEM 6 (2003), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/uspc/history.pdf; see also 
Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 227 (“Under the rehabilitative model, parole officials’ power 
to determine a sentence’s duration was seen both as a valuable incentive to prison inmates to 
rehabilitate themselves and as a vehicle to permit “experts” to determine when sufficient 
rehabilitation had occurred to warrant release from prison.”). 
 86. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 3, 36 Stat. 819; Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure 
of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1321 n.23 
(2005); Luna, Gridland supra note 79; Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 226. 
 87. Bowman, Debacle, supra note 80, at 371 (“In many systems, the parole board had 
an equal or even greater voice than the judge in determining how much time defendants 
would really serve.”); Luna, Gridland supra note 79 (“[T]rial court judges retained primary 
control over punishment, as Congress had established only maximum prison terms for most 
federal offenses, thus giving district courts the discretion to impose sentences below that 
limit.”); Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 29 CRIME & 
JUST. 39, 43 (2002) (describing North Carolina sentencing practices prior to 1981, which 
involved largely unconstrained front-end judicial sentencing discretion combined with a 
back-end parole release mechanism, as “typical for the times”).  In the federal system, the 
judge could constrain the Parole Board in certain ways: 
Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court . . . when in its opinion the ends 
of justice and best interest of the public require that the defendant be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, may (1) designate in the sentence of 
SCHRAA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
914 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
By the 1970s, however, this rehabilitative theory, with its emphasis on 
individualized, indeterminate sentencing and parole, came under increasing 
criticism from across the political spectrum.88  The left believed it produced 
unacceptable and frequently racially motivated sentencing disparities, 
which themselves harmed prisoners by causing them anxiety about their 
sentences.89  The right called for “truth in sentencing,” that is, for offenders 
to serve their entire sentence,90 which, generally speaking, the right be-
 
imprisonment imposed a minimum term at the expiration of which the prisoner 
shall become eligible for parole, which term may be less than but shall not be 
more than one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the court, or (2) the 
court may fix the maximum sentence of imprisonment to be served in which event 
the court may specify that the prisoner may be released on parole at such time as 
the Commission may determine. 
18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1982) (repealed by Pub. L. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027). 
 88. For example, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, of which the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984 was a part, had sponsors both on the left, including Senators Joseph 
Biden, Edward M. Kennedy, and Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz, and on the right, 
including Senators Roman L. Hruska and Strom Thurmond. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 37 
(1984); see also Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing, CATO 
POL’Y ANALYSIS, Nov. 1, 2002, at 4-5 (discussing convergence of opinion against indeter-
minate punishment and the odd political coalition that produced the Sentencing Reform 
Act); Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 223 (noting that sentencing reform legislation was 
“conceived by liberal reformers as an anti-imprisonment and antidiscrimination measure, 
but finally born as part of a more conservative law-and-order crime control measure”); Alan 
Dershowitz, Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1975, Magazine Sec-
tion, at 7 (“[A] surprising consensus is emerging around the idea that it is time to return to 
uniformity in sentencing.”).  President Ronald Reagan signed the Reform Act, which had 
passed both Houses of Congress with “overwhelming” majorities. Stith & Koh, supra note 
82, at 223. 
 89. Liberal reformers believed rehabilitation had not proven successful, that it bred an-
xiety among prisoners because of uncertainty about their release dates and disparity in sen-
tences, and that the disparities were “at odds with ideals of equality” that could produce bias 
against minorities. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 227. 
  Indeed, the most influential criticism of indeterminate federal sentencing and parole 
was that of a liberal, Marvin E. Frankel, a federal district judge. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. 
26, 503 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (referring to Judge Frankel as the “father of 
sentencing reform”); Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 228; Steven Greenhouse, Marvin E. 
Frankel, Federal Judge and Pioneer of Sentencing Guidelines, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
5, 2002, at C15 (quoting Judge Marvin’s 1973 statement denouncing Nixon’s “proposals for 
severity” in criminal sentencing as “neither new nor useful, but only invite us to official 
cruelties unlikely to accomplish anything beneficial”). 
  In 1972, Judge Frankel indicted the federal judiciary’s sentencing authority as “al-
most wholly unchecked and sweeping” and “terrifying and intolerable for a society that pro-
fesses devotion to the rule of law.” MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITH-
OUT ORDER 5 (1973); see also Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1 (1972). 
 90. See, e.g., Bowman, Debacle, supra note 80, at 374 (describing circumstances in the 
1960s and 1970s that produced “a national movement toward tougher, more definite, less 
discretionary criminal sentences for both drug offenses and traditional crimes against per-
sons and property”); Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 227 (citing J. Edgar Hoover, The Dire 
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lieved should be longer.91  Under these influences, the dominant theory of 
punishment shifted in the 1970s and 1980s to one deemphasizing rehabili-
tation and embracing punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation.92  In re-
sponse to these criticisms, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.93 
2. Congress’ Intent: Rehabilitation’s Tenuous Hold 
The Senate Report introducing the Sentencing Reform Act denounced 
the old system of indeterminate sentences.  First, it stated that the “unjusti-
fiabl[e]” disparities it produced were the direct result of the “unfettered dis-
cretion the law confers on . . . judges and parole authorities” to impose and 
implement sentences, and blamed the system’s “sweeping discretion” on a 
“lack of statutory guidance.”94  Second, it noted “the fact that the sentenc-
ing judges and parole officers are constantly second-guessing each other” 
compounded these disparities, and that, based on “when they believe the 
Parole Commission will release” the offender, “some judges deliberately 
impose sentences above . . . [or] below the [parole] guidelines in order to 
retain control over the release date.”95  Third, it stated that the system led to 
“prisoners and the public . . . seldom [being] certain about the real sentence 
a defendant will serve.”96 
The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission, whose mem-
bers the President appoints and may remove for cause,97 and charged it 
 
Consequences of the Premature Release of Dangerous Criminals Through Probation and 
Parole, 27 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1 (1958)) (noting that critics on the right were dis-
satisfied with the “perceived leniency of sentencing judges and parole officials”). 
 91. Explaining its rationale for creating sentences in 1987, the United States Sentencing 
Commission stated that, while it usually synthesized pre-Sentencing Reform practices, “leg-
islative direction” superseded that analysis for drug crimes, rape, white-collar crimes, and 
violent crimes, all of which received “much higher” sentences. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 
16-19 (1987), available at www.fd.org/pdf_lib/Supplementary%20Report.pdf. 
  Under the Guidelines, nominal sentences increased on average by nearly 80% (from 
twenty-eight months to fifty months), and actual time served rose by 230% (from thirteen 
months to forty-three months). Luna, Gridland, supra note 79, at 45 & n.117, 46.  The eli-
mination of parole also contributed to this increase. Id. at 45 n.117. 
 92. Bowman, Debacle, supra note 80, at 364-65. 
 93. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). 
 94. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1984). 
 95. Id. at 47-48. 
 96. Id. at 38-39. 
 97. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006) (original version at Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, § 217(a), 
Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2017). 
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with creating and disseminating Sentencing Guidelines.98  It also compelled 
judges to fix exact, reviewable sentences99—although the Bureau of Pris-
ons retained the power to award small discounts for good behavior in pris-
on.100  Critics contend, however, that the Sentencing Commission’s Guide-
lines did not reduce disparities, but may actually have increased them, 
while also hiding them from public scrutiny.101 
 
 98. According to the statute, the purpose of the Commission is to “establish sentencing 
policies and practices” for the federal justice system that—as also stated in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(2)—“reflect the seriousness of the offence,” promote “respect for the law,” and 
provide “just punishment,” while also affording “adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” 
protecting the public from any future crimes of the defendant, and providing him or her with 
“needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in 
the most effective manner.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). 
  The sentencing practices that the Commission establishes must also “provide cer-
tainty and fairness . . . avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities . . . while maintaining 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted,” to reflect “ad-
vancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process,” 
and, finally, to develop “means of measuring” whether sentencing practices are effective in 
deterring crime, providing just punishment and the other § 3553(a)(2) factors. 28 U.S.C. § 
991(b). 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b) (allowing the defendant and the Government, respectively, 
to appeal a sentence or condition of probation or supervised release) (original version at 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 213(a), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2011). 
 100. Id. § 3624(b)(1) (allowing the Bureau of Prisons to award most prisoners up to fifty-
four days’ credit toward their sentence for “exemplary compliance with institutional discip-
linary regulations,” and mandating that the Bureau consider, if relevant, whether the prison-
er has earned or is making progress toward earning a high school diploma) (original version 
at Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II,  § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2008). 
 101. See, e.g., Address to the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 224, 226 (1990) (statement of Thomas W. Hillier, II, Fed-
eral Public Defender) (“Disparity under the Sentencing Guidelines continues in several insi-
dious forms. Vagaries in plea bargaining and charging practices of United States Attorneys 
throughout the country contribute to disparate sentences. . . . Finally, judges, torn between 
‘injustice and infidelity,’ decide cases differently.”); Jelani Jefferson Exum, Why March to a 
Uniform Beat?, 15 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 141, 157-58 (2010) (“[S]cholars have pointed to the 
complexity of Guidelines calculations as a contributor to sentencing disparities.  The nu-
merous factors involved in calculating sentences using the Guidelines can lead to varying 
results depending upon who selects the factors to include in the computation.  This discre-
pancy has been shown by studies involving different probation officers who, given the same 
facts, come to different sentencing range determinations.”); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality 
of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 164-65 (1991) 
(“Continuing disparities are largely systemic in nature, arising out of . . . the guidelines.  
The most disturbing systemic disparity is the apparent disparate treatment of young, black 
males, who on the average receive guidelines sentences significantly longer than those re-
ceived by their white counterparts for similar offenses.  Disparities also result from the in-
vestigative, charging, and guilty plea practices of prosecutors.”); Stith & Koh, supra note 
81, at 287 (“We also believe that unwarranted sentencing disparity is as great now as it was 
before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.”). But see Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, 
Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and 
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The Act abolished the parole system entirely, despite the fact that less 
than ten years before, in 1976, Congress had overhauled the indeterminate 
parole system in favor a guideline system102 similar to the one that the Act 
adopted for sentencing.103  The 1970s overhaul had promised to provide “a 
scientific and objective means of structuring and institutionalizing discre-
tion in parole release decision-making” and minimize sentencing dispari-
ties.104  Nonetheless, many sentencing reform advocates wanted the com-
plete elimination of the discretion and uncertainty inherent in the parole 
system.105  Critics on the left were particularly concerned by the fact that 
the period of a defendant’s “street supervision” following their release by 
the Parole Board depended on the time remaining on the original sentence, 
rather than on the defendant’s actual needs.106 
Under these pressures, the Act replaced parole with the new concept of 
supervised release.107  In some ways, supervised release is very different 
 
Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 444 (1991) (presenting a study indicating the guide-
lines were generally effective in reducing disparity). 
 102. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 
219 (codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C. & 18 U.S.C. (1982) (repealed 1984)). 
 103. See Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D. Conn. 1973) (providing a copy of 
the guidelines that the United States Parole Board adopted in 1973 in Appendix II); 38 Fed. 
Reg. 26,652 (Sept. 24, 1973) (citing 38 Fed. Reg. § 2.24(i) at 26,655) (stating, for example, 
that the Parole Board “shall adopt and periodically review explicit guidelines for parole de-
cisionmaking to insure consistent treatment of similarly situated offenders”); see also Stith 
& Koh, supra note 82, at 229 (noting that “[l]ike the sentencing guidelines grid which the 
United States Sentencing Commission would institute a decade later, the parole Guideline 
Table consisted of a two-dimensional matrix,” with one axis assessing the offense’s severity 
and the other the inmate’s prior criminal record). 
 104. William J. Genego, Peter D. Goldberg & Vicki C. Jackson, Project: Parole Release 
Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 823 (1975).  The Yale Law 
Journal’s 1974 examination of parole reform played a seminal role in the 1970s overhaul of 
the parole system. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 229. 
 105. See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, New Studies Insist on the Same Treatment for the Same 
Crimes; Inequities Common in Jail Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1976, at D8 (quoting 
David Rudenstine, Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, on parole: “Junk it”); 
President Ronald Reagan, Speech at the Department of Justice (Oct. 14, 1982), in Text of 
President’s Speech on Drive Against Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1982, at A20 (arguing that 
the “criminal justice system has broken down” because the justice system coddled rather 
than deterred, and prosecuted a growing “hardened criminal class,” and promising increased 
spending on prisons and jails to remove the incentive to release prisoners early). 
 106. Paula K. Biderman & Jon M. Sands, A Prescribed Failure: The Lost Potential of 
Supervised Release, 6. FED. SENT. R. 204, 204 (1994) (the authors were federal public de-
fenders at the time of publication). 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) (original version at Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 
12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1999).  In the words of a federal district court judge: “In many ways su-
pervised release was akin to probation and in other respects parole, but any such analysis 
provides only a glimmer of familiarity and, to be honest, adds some confusion.”  Harold 
Baer, Jr., The Alpha and Omega of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REV. 267, 268 (1996). 
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from parole.  It supplements a sentence, rather than decreasing it: after 
serving their full sentence, in accordance with the Act’s truth in sentencing 
ethos,108 prisoners can be released into an additional term of supervision.109  
Moreover—whereas the decision of whether to release a prisoner early on 
parole took place while the prisoner was in prison, based on his or her ap-
parent progress towards rehabilitation110—the decision about whether to 
impose a term of supervised release occurs before the sentence begins, and 
must be “based on factors known at the time of sentencing.”111  Congress 
likely enacted this measure to ensure that discretion—which can result in 
treating the defendant either too leniently or too harshly—did not “creep 
back into the system.”112 
In other ways, however, supervised release bears a strong resemblance to 
its predecessor.  First, the Act uses language from the repealed federal pa-
role statute to mandate that conditions of supervision be “reasonably re-
lated” to the offense and the defendant’s history and character.113  The Act 
gave the responsibility for imposing conditions of release, which had for-
merly belonged to the Parole Board,114 to the sentencing judge.115  Doing 
so addressed Congress’ concern about judges and parole officers acting at 
cross-purposes.116 
Second, Congress seems to have intended supervised release to serve the 
same rehabilitative function that post-parole supervision had also been in-
tended to serve.  The Senate Report stated: “[T]he sentencing purposes of 
incapacitation and punishment would not be served by a term of supervised 
 
 108. See, e.g., S. REP. 98-225, at 56 (1983) (“Under the bill, the sentence imposed by the 
judge will be the sentence actually served.”). 
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a); see also Sterling, supra note 78, at 1183. 
 110. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 111. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 56. 
 112. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 235 n.73 (citing 1980 Senate Dill (S. 1722) on super-
vised release, which was a precursor to the eventual supervised release statute). 
 113. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4209(a) (1982) (repealed) (creating mandatory conditions, 
such as drug testing and the prohibition on committing another crime, and conditions within 
the Parole Commission’s discretion, which had to be “reasonably related” to the “nature and 
circumstances of the offense” and the parolee’s “history and characteristics”), with 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2006) (mandating drug testing and prohibitions on committing other 
crimes as supervised release conditions, and allowing judge to add conditions so long as 
they relate to specified factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).  Subsections 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) 
state: the “nature and circumstances of the offense” and “history and characteristics of the 
defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 114. 18 U.S.C. § 4209(a) (1982). 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 
 116. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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release,” rather, “the primary goal of such a term is to ease the defendant’s 
transition into the community . . . or to provide rehabilitation.”117 
However, before supervised release’s 1987 implementation, the domin-
ance of conservative political views wrought significant changes on the sta-
tute.118  Congress first amended it in 1986 by adding a revocation proce-
dure that allows the judge to end supervised release and return the offender 
to prison for violation of any condition.119  In 1988, it added a provision for 
mandatory revocation should the court find that the defendant has been “in 
the possession of a controlled substance.”120 
The Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines, which were mandatory until 
2005,121 and continue to strongly affect sentencing,122 also increased the 
punitive aspect of supervised release.  First, the Guidelines require mini-
 
 117. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983). 
 118. Biderman & Sands, supra note 106 (“In the years following the passage of . . . [the 
Sentencing Reform Act], Congress shifted the primary purpose of supervised release from 
rehabilitation to punishment and deterrence”); Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 286 (“Over the 
course of four Congresses, Senator Kennedy’s bill accumulated compromise after compro-
mise with more conservative forces.”). 
 119. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1006(a), 100 Stat. 3207-6 (1986) (authorizing 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e), which provides for revocation of supervised release within judge’s discretion).  
Prior to this amendment, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report indicated that revocation 
was not authorized because the Committee “does not believe that a minor violation of a 
condition of supervised release should result in resentencing of the defendant and because it 
believes that a more serious violation should be dealt with as a new offense.” S. REP. NO. 
98-225, at 125. 
 120. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7303(b)(2), 102 Stat. 4464 (1988) (“If the defendant is found 
by the court to be in the possession of a controlled substance, the court shall terminate the 
term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve in prison not less than one-
third of the term of supervised release.”).  Today, section 3583(g) also mandates revocation 
if the defendant possesses a firearm, refuses to comply with drug testing, or tests positive for 
drugs more than three times in a year. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (2006). 
 121. United States v. Booker held that the Sentencing Guidelines could not constitutional-
ly be mandatory, and that the Sentencing Reform Act had to be amended to make the Guide-
lines “effectively advisory,” requiring the sentencing court only “to consider” them. 543 
U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 122. Since Booker, in the vast majority of cases, courts continue to impose the minimum 
supervised release period described by the Guidelines in section 5D1.1(a) (courts should 
impose supervised release for sentences over a year) and section 5D1.2 (prescribing the 
length of time that the supervised release should last for various categories of offenses). 
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE 7, 52, 57 
(2010) [hereinafter FEDERAL OFFENDERS].  The Supreme Court has also emphasized the im-
portance of adhering to the Guidelines, despite their advisory nature. Booker, 543 U.S. at 
264 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must . . . take them into 
account when sentencing.”); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“As a 
matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the 
starting point and the initial benchmark.”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 342 (2007) 
(stating that a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating 
the applicable Guidelines range). 
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mum supervised release terms for most sentences,123 so that the length of 
supervised release now arguably depends more on the original offense than 
on the defendant’s post-incarceration needs.124  Second, they recommend 
numerous and fairly restrictive conditions in all cases: the fifteen “stan-
dard” conditions of supervised release include geographic restrictions, an 
employment requirement, and a prohibition on the “excessive use of alco-
hol.”125  The Guidelines also prescribe seven “special” conditions,126 which 
 
 123. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1(a) (2009) (mandating that 
courts impose supervised release for sentences of one year or more, or when so required by 
statute), limited on constitutional grounds by Booker, 543 U.S. 220. 
 124. Biderman & Sands, supra note 106, at 205 (“The length of a term of supervised re-
lease is based on the classification of the original offense, not on the particular person’s 
need to readjust to non-prison life.”). 
 125. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3 (c)-(d).  The Guidelines pro-
vide, in pertinent part: 
(c) (Policy Statement) The following “standard” conditions are recommended for 
supervised release. Several of the conditions are expansions of the conditions re-
quired by statute . . . . [The defendant shall]: 
(1) . . . not leave the judicial district or other specified geographic area with-
out the permission of the court or probation officer; 
(2) . . . report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation of-
ficer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first 
five days of each month; 
(3) . . . answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the 
instructions of the probation officer; 
(4) . . . support the defendant’s dependents and meet other family responsibil-
ities . . . ; 
(5) . . . work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation 
officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons; 
(6) . . . notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change of 
residence or employment; 
(7) . . . refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, 
use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance, or any paraphernalia 
related to any controlled substance, except as prescribed by a physician; 
(8) . . . not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, 
used, distributed, or administered, or other places specified by the court; 
(9) . . . not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity, and shall 
not associate with any person convicted of a felony unless granted permis-
sion to do so by the probation officer; 
(10) . . . permit a probation officer to visit the defendant at any time at home 
or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in 
plain view by the probation officer; 
(11) . . . notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being ar-
rested or questioned by a law enforcement officer; 
(12) . . . not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent 
of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; 
(13) as directed by the probation officer . . . notify third parties of risks that 
may be occasioned by the defendant’s criminal record or personal history or 
characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifica-
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tions and to confirm the defendant’s compliance with such notification re-
quirement; 
(14) . . . pay the special assessment imposed or adhere to a court-ordered in-
stallment schedule for the payment of the special assessment; 
(15) . . . notify the probation officer of any material change in the defendant’s 
economic circumstances that might affect the defendant’s ability to pay any 
unpaid amount of restitution, fines, or special assessments. 
Id. § 5D1.3(c). 
 126. The additional conditions set out in the Guidelines are: 
(d) (Policy Statement) The following “special” conditions of supervised release 
are recommended in the circumstances described and, in addition, may otherwise 
be appropriate in particular cases: 
(1) Possession of Weapons 
If the instant conviction is for a felony, or if the defendant was previously 
convicted of a felony or used a firearm or other dangerous weapon in the 
course of the instant offense—a condition prohibiting the defendant from 
possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon. 
(2) Debt Obligations 
If an installment schedule of payment of restitution or a fine is imposed—a 
condition prohibiting the defendant from incurring new credit charges or 
opening additional lines of credit without approval of the probation officer 
unless the defendant is in compliance with the payment schedule. 
(3) Access to Financial Information 
If the court imposes an order of restitution, forfeiture, or notice to victims, or 
orders the defendant to pay a fine—a condition requiring the defendant to 
provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information. 
(4) Substance Abuse Program Participation 
If the court has reason to believe that the defendant is an abuser of narcotics, 
other controlled substances or alcohol—a condition requiring the defendant 
to participate in a program approved by the United States Probation Office 
for substance abuse, which program may include testing to determine wheth-
er the defendant has reverted to the use of drugs or alcohol. 
(5) Mental Health Program Participation 
If the court has reason to believe that the defendant is in need of psychologi-
cal or psychiatric treatment—a condition requiring that the defendant partici-
pate in a mental health program approved by the United States Probation Of-
fice. 
(6) Deportation 
If (A) the defendant and the United States entered into a stipulation of depor-
tation . . . ; or (B) in the absence of a stipulation of deportation, if, after no-
tice and hearing pursuant to such section, the Attorney General demonstrates 
by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is deportable—a condition 
ordering deportation by a United States district court or a United States magi-
strate judge. 
(7) Sex Offenses 
If the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense . . . 
(A) A condition requiring the defendant to participate in a program ap-
proved by the United States Probation Office for the treatment and mon-
itoring of sex offenders. 
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depend on the defendant’s circumstances, such as a requirement that the 
defendant participate in a mental health program if the court has reason to 
believe the defendant needs such treatment, and six “additional” conditions, 
to be imposed on “a case-by-case basis.”127 
Critics claim these changes have made the statute primarily punitive—
aimed more at keeping offenders off the streets than at shepherding them 
back safely into the community.128  The Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee at the time later placed the blame for this shift in the statute’s 
purpose on the fact that a “presidentially appointed panel can too easily be 
dominated by political interests,” especially the “temptation to seek public 
approval by appearing tough on crime and therefore to propose standards 
biased in favor of prosecution and incarceration.”129  Calling the Sentenc-
ing Commission a “junior-varsity Congress,” Justice Scalia also accused 
the system of disrupting the separation of powers in a dissent from the 1989 
Supreme Court case that upheld the Commission.130 
 
(B) A condition limiting the use of a computer or an interactive comput-
er service in cases in which the defendant used such items. 
(C) A condition requiring the defendant to submit to a search, at any 
time, with or without a warrant, and by any law enforcement or proba-
tion officer, of the defendant’s person and any property, house, resi-
dence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic communication or da-
ta storage devices or media, and effects upon reasonable suspicion 
concerning a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful 
conduct by the defendant, or by any probation officer in the lawful dis-
charge of the officer’s supervision functions. 
Id. § 5D1.3(d). 
 127. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(e). 
 128. “The present [supervised release] system amounts to little more than increased pu-
nishment.  If this is what lawmakers want supervised release to be, the more honest way to 
achieve it—‘honesty in sentencing’—is to do away with supervised release and lengthen 
sentences.” Biderman & Sands, supra note 106, at 207. 
  Many critics of the scheme’s increased harshness believe it is the result of the reduc-
tion in the judiciary’s power over the criminal system. See, e.g., Legislation to Revise and 
Recodify Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 1491 (1978) (testimony of Senior 
Judge Alphonse J. Zirpoli) (“[The] Sentencing Commission . . . [is] inseparable from the 
judicial functions vested in the courts by Article III of the Constitution, control of . . . 
[which] should be vested in the Judicial Conference . . . rather than in the executive branch 
 . . . and thus avoid conflict in the application of the principle of separation of powers.”); 
Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 281 (“[I]t is clear that the sentencing guidelines have effected 
a fundamental transfer of authority over criminal sentencing from an independent judiciary 
to a politically dependent government agency—severely diminishing the judiciary’s role as 
a check and a balance on the political branches of government.”). 
 129. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 236 (quoting Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Federal Criminal 
Sentencing Reform, 11 J. LEGIS. 218, 131 (1984)). 
 130. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, many of the Commission’s decisions, such as when probation may 
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Nonetheless, in theory at least, the original congressional purpose of su-
pervised release remains paramount.  According to the Sentencing Com-
mission, “[T]he purpose of . . . supervised release should focus on the inte-
gration of the violator into the community, while providing the supervision 
designed to limit further criminal conduct.”131  Similarly, the Supreme 
Court has stated, “Congress intended supervised release to assist individu-
als in their transition to community life.  Supervised release fulfills rehabi-
litative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”132 
3. In Practice: Costly and Ineffective 
In the last few years, the pendulum seems to be swinging back towards a 
rehabilitative ethos, and all three branches of the federal government have 
shown signs of dissatisfaction with supervised release.133  Congress, for ex-
ample, passed the Second Chance Act in 2008,134 whose stated aims are to 
“encourage the development and support of . . . evidence-based programs 
 
be imposed, “are heavily laden (or ought to be) with value judgments and policy assess-
ments,” and should be made by a legislature. Id. at 414-15. 
 131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at ch. 7, pt. A(4) (2008); see also FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS, supra note 122, at 2 (citing United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 50 
(1994)) (“[S]upervised release . . . is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration” and, moreo-
ver, supervised release is primarily concerned with “facilitat[ing] the reintegration of the 
defendant into the community.”). 
 132. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). 
 133. The most recent available statistics show that only fifty-five percent of federal su-
pervised release cases terminated without violation. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 231822, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2008 STATISTICAL TABLES 33 
tbl.7.5 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf; 
see also FEDERAL OFFENDERS, supra note 122, at 68 (stating that “revocations accounted for 
one-third of all supervision cases closed between 2005 and 2008,” according to statistics 
from the U.S. Court’s Administrative Office); Biderman & Sands, supra note 106, at 204 
n.1, 205 (noting that, as promulgated by the Guidelines, conditions “will make successful 
completion of a term of supervised release almost totally infeasible,” and citing the U.S. 
Court’s Administrative Office for the statistic that, in 1992, nearly fifty percent of people 
had their supervised release revoked). 
  These statistics are likely due to the fact that inmates who struggle with drug addic-
tion and mental health problems constitute a large portion of the federal inmate population. 
See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 209588, SUBSTANCE 
DEPENDENCE, ABUSE, AND TREATMENT OF JAIL INMATES, 2002, at 1 (2005), available at 
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sdatji02.pdf (“In 2002 more than two-thirds of jail in-
mates were found to be dependent on or to abuse alcohol or drugs.”); BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 213600, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON 
AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf (“At 
midyear 2005 more than half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem, in-
cluding . . . 45% of Federal prisoners.”); FEDERAL OFFENDERS, supra note 122, at 65 (stating 
that drug offenders constituted the largest portion of the supervision caseload, at forty-five 
percent of the cases closed in fiscal year 2008). 
 134. Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008). 
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that . . . reduce recidivism, such as substance abuse treatment, alternatives 
to incarceration, and comprehensive reentry services,” and to achieve a 
“reduction in violations of conditions of supervised release.”135  Similarly, 
the Justice Department announced in late 2010 that it would be spending 
$110 million on reentry programs.136 
Moreover, a growing number of federal district courts are instituting in-
tensive reentry programs to deal more effectively with their supervised 
populations, especially those struggling with addiction.137  A consent form 
for one of these programs—offenders opt into them—describes it as “more 
intense than regular supervised release,” in that “[y]ou will probably meet 
with the judge and your probation officer every month,” be “tested for 
drugs and alcohol frequently,” and have a higher probability of the judge 
imposing sanctions for violations of conditions, such as curfews or week-
ends in jail.138 
Rehabilitative programs, such as reentry courts, with their focus on 
stemming addiction and other root causes of criminal behavior, appear to 
save money.139  Thus, the shift towards a more rehabilitative supervision 
 
 135. 122 Stat. 657, 664, 658 (2008).  The U.S. Sentencing Commission appears to be tak-
ing note of the effect of this Act on supervised release. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS, supra note 
122, at 2 n.11 (engaging in a lengthy discussion of the Act in the context of explaining the 
purpose behind supervised release).  Federal courts are also using the Act to inform their 
decisions concerning supervised release. See United States v. Wessels, 539 F.3d 913, 915 
(8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J. concurring) (“In this Act, the Congress has directed a shift from 
policing those on parole to rehabilitating them.  The parole system now bears an increasing 
special obligation to help federal offenders successfully reenter into society.”). 
 136. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Office of Pub. Affairs, Department Announces 
$110 Million for Reentry Programs; Efforts to Reduce Spending on Corrections (Oct. 8, 
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-ag-1129.html.  The 
money will in part go toward Second Chance Act reentry grants and other initiatives which 
aim to reduce “recidivism rates and state and local spending on corrections through the use 
of evidence-based, smart-on-crime approaches.” Id. 
 137. At least six federal district courts have reentry programs, including: the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York (since 2002); the District of Oregon and the Western District of Michigan 
(since 2005); the District of Massachusetts and the Southern District of Mississippi (since 
2006); the Southern District of Indiana and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (since 
2007); and the Eastern Districts of Utah and of Missouri (since 2008). KEVIN ALLTUCKER ET 
AL., THE DISTRICT OF OREGON REENTRY COURT: EVALUATION, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 
AND REPLICATION STRATEGIES 2 (2009). 
 138. EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, INTENSIVE POST-SENTENCE DRUG SUPERVISION 
PROGRAM CONSENT FORM 2 (2006). 
 139. See, e.g., NPC RES., INC., A DETAILED COST ANALYSIS IN A MATURE DRUG COURT 
SETTING: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE MULTNOMAH COUNTY DRUG COURT II (2003) 
(finding that a state drug court in Oregon reduced investment per offender by over $5,000); 
Brandon C. Welsh, Monetary Costs and Benefits of Correctional Treatment Programs: Im-
plications for Offender Reentry, 68 FED. PROBATION 9, 12 (2004) (finding almost uniform 
conclusion among studies that drug courts result in savings). 
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system is a result of the punitive model’s high incarceration levels and re-
lated costs, which have become more problematic during the recent reces-
sion.140 
Supervised release is a relatively expensive system because of its moni-
toring costs and revocation rate of about ten percent, which results in fur-
ther incarceration costs.141  The Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines 
called for extensive use of supervised release, as shown above in Section 
I.B.2,142 and thus made the system more expensive than it might theoreti-
cally have been.  Federal statutes require imposition of supervised release 
in less than half of federal crimes; yet from 2005 to 2009, sentencing courts 
have imposed supervised release terms in ninety-nine percent of cases in 
which the judge need not have imposed any term.143  Moreover, those 
terms were relatively long, averaging more than three years.144 
Critics have also pointed out that the Guidelines “do not detail how a 
court should predict the rehabilitative needs the defendant will face in the 
distant future”145—a problem arguably at the root of the judicial split that 
this Note examines.  Indeed, while the Guidelines are extremely detailed in 
spelling out the conditions the Sentencing Commission believes courts 
 
 140. See, e.g., CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: RE-
THINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 2 (2009), available at http://www.vera.org/The-fiscal-
crisis-in-corrections_July-2009.pdf (stating that, under the influence of the recession, states 
are using a variety of methods to shrink their inmate populations, such as increasing the 
availability of parole and investing more resources into reentry programs); see also 
CHARLES B. SIFTON & JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REPORT ON A PROPOSED INTENSIVE POST-
SENTENCE SUPERVISION PROGRAM FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 3 (2006) 
(“[T]he Program seeks to reduce expenditures on supervision.”); Cecilia Klingele, Changing 
the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 465 (2010) (“[I]n the 
wake of unprecedented budget shortfalls, state governments [are] [r]eversing years of ever-
harsher sentencing policies.”). 
  Nationwide, public spending on corrections increased from under $10 billion in 
1982 to $60 billion in 2002. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, REPORT OF THE RE-ENTRY POLICY 
COUNCIL: CHARTING THE SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL RETURN OF PRISONERS TO THE COMMUNITY 
1 (2005), available at http://reentrypolicy.org/Report/Download (follow “download” hyper-
link). 
 141. See FEDERAL OFFENDERS, supra note 122, at 49-69.  In 2007-2008, there were 
23,820 arrests for violations of supervised release conditions, constituting 13.6% of all fed-
eral arrests. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 231822, FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 2008-STATISTICAL TABLES 5 tbl.1.1 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf.  This number is down from 2001-2002, however, 
when it was nearly one-fifth of all federal arrests. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 207447, STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING 2002, at 
7 (2001), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fccp02.pdf. 
 142. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text. 
 143. FEDERAL OFFENDERS, supra note 122, at 3-4. 
 144. Id. at 4. 
 145. Biderman & Sands, supra note 105, at 206. 
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should impose upon defendants,146 they do not provide guidance for carry-
ing out their stated rehabilitative mission, nor do they address the “real 
world” issues that recently released offenders might face in seeking em-
ployment and refraining from drug use.147 
In addition, some scholars have blamed the role that probation officers 
play in the Sentencing Reform scheme for pushing to keep sentences leng-
thy, especially since the Guidelines became advisory after Booker.148  The 
Sentencing Commission, they argue, transformed the role of the probation 
officer by teaching them the content and application of the hundreds of 
pages of Guidelines rules, resulting in officers seeing themselves more as 
law-enforcement agents than social workers.149  According to the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act’s Senate Report, Congress feared that plea agreements 
could “reduce the benefits” of the Guidelines,150 which motivated the Sen-
tencing Commission to train probation officers to conduct their own inves-
tigation of facts relevant to sentencing and report those facts to the court 
should the plea bargain not reflect them.151  Moreover, judges tend to value 
the probation officer’s reports as being neutral, when they may instead re-
flect anti-defendant, prosecutorial bias.152 
However, evidence from the federal district courts’ reentry programs, 
mentioned above in Part I.B.2, suggests that the probation officers in those 
districts place a greater priority on improving the outcomes of those on su-
pervised release than on adhering to the Guidelines.  Probation offices fre-
 
 146. See supra notes 122, 124-125 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Biderman & Sands, supra note 105, at 206. 
 148. See Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal 
Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“[T]oday’s federal probation officers see 
themselves primarily as law-enforcement agents rather than agents of mercy.  The transfor-
mation of the federal probation officer’s role is owed to the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.”); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Political Economy of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 235, 245 (“The Sentencing Reform Act affected . . . institutional players . . . 
changing the role of probation officers from quasi social workers to special masters of 
Guidelines fact-finding.”); Nancy Glass, The Social Workers of Sentencing? Probation Of-
ficers, Discretion, and the Accuracy of Presentence Reports Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 46 NO. 1 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 2, III.4. (2010) (“[Probation] officers’ orientation 
toward the Guidelines has apparently slowed the pace of sentencing reform in the post-
Booker period.”); Kate Stith, Judges, Prosecutors and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE 
L.J. 1420, 1437 (“The Sentencing Commission boldly sought to transform both the role of 
the probation officer and the content of the pre-sentence report, [by taking] great pains to 
teach probation officers around the country the content and application of the hundreds of 
pages of Guidelines rules.”). 
 149. See Glass, supra note 147, at para. 13. 
 150. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 167 (1983). 
 151. Glass, supra note 147, at pt. III.3. 
 152. Id. 
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quently spearhead these reentry programs, which involve substantially 
more work from probation officers than does regular supervised release.153 
In all, it seems that the role that probation officers play in the supervised 
release scheme varies substantially from district to district.154  Moreover, 
scholars acknowledge that research into the role of probation officers under 
the Sentencing Reform Act is lacking.155  Thus, generalizing about their 
role in the supervised release system is difficult. 
C. The Supervised Release Statute 
This section briefly outlines how the supervised release statute works.  
The main provisions of supervised release are in 18 U.S.C. § 3583,156 
which gives the court some discretion to place the defendant on supervised 
release, usually for up to only five years, depending on the class of felony 
committed.157 
1. Imposing Conditions 
Section 3583(c) requires that, before they include a supervised release 
term, judges must consult section 3553(a), which prescribes factors judges 
 
 153. See, e.g., ALLTUCKER ET AL., supra note 136, at 8, 28, 31 (discussing, respectively, 
the lead that the Oregon Probation Office took in setting up the reentry court, the “extensive 
professional training and experience in both case management and law enforcement” of its 
officers, and the extent of the monthly commitment from the Office, which must prepare a 
detailed report on each participant before each hearing); CAITLIN J. TAYLOR, FED. PROBA-
TION DEP’T, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE KEY COMPONENTS OF THE SUPERVISION TO AID REEN-
TRY (STAR) PROGRAM: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO EX-OFFENDER REENTRY THROUGH 
UNIQUE JUDICIAL ROLES, SANCTIONS & REWARDS, PARTNERSHIPS WITH SOCIAL SERVICE 
PROVIDERS AND ENHANCED SOCIAL CAPITAL 3 (2010) (stating that the Probation Office for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania initiated the reentry program); SIFTON & WEINSTEIN, 
supra note 139, at 1 (indicating that the Probation Department developed the reentry pro-
gram at the request of Judge Sifton). 
  Kelley O’Keefe, the Supervising U.S. Probation Officer and Clinical Coordinator 
for the Eastern District of New York, stated: “The [reentry court] is a lot more work for our 
department, but we do it because we think it produces results.” Interview with Kelley 
O’Keefe, U.S. Probation Office for the Eastern District of New York, in Brooklyn, N.Y. 
(Nov. 4, 2010). 
 154. See Glass, supra note 147, at Introduction & n.8 (“[L]ocal practices vary between 
districts,”  because of “the vast regional variations in federal districts across the country.”). 
 155. See Bascuas, supra note 147, at 3 (“[A]ssigning the United States Probation Office 
to investigate defendants and to argue for particular sentencing outcomes ha[s] received . . . 
scant attention.”); Glass, supra note 147, at pt. II.1 (“It is difficult to assemble a profile of 
the typical person who becomes a probation officer because there are no national statistics 
on probation officers’ backgrounds.”). 
 156. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006). 
 157. Id. § 3583(a)-(b).  Federal criminal statutes often mandate a term of supervised re-
lease. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text. 
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must consider when imposing any sentence.158  The section 3553 factors 
include the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s character and his-
tory, the need to protect the public from the defendant and provide restitu-
tion to victims, the goal of helping the defendant by providing educational 
or vocational training or medical care, and the avoidance of “unwarranted” 
sentence disparities.159  Thus, section 3583 allows the judge some discre-
tion, based on the particulars of the case, to implement supervised release.  
However, judges must also examine the Sentencing Commission’s Guide-
lines, which prescribe numerous additional standard conditions and contin-
ue to inhibit judicial discretion, even though they are no longer strictly 
mandatory.160 
Section 3583(c) does not point to all of section 3553(a)’s factors, how-
ever.161  In particular, it leaves out section 3553(a)(2)(A), “the need for the 
sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”162  In 
this way, section 3583 demonstrates its roots in the rehabilitative parole 
system—it seems more concerned with looking forward to the defendant’s 
integration back into society than back at the defendant’s crime. 
Section 3583(d) describes conditions of supervised release, some of 
which are mandatory and some of which are discretionary.163  For example, 
the judge must order the defendant to refrain from committing another 
crime and to submit to three drug tests.164  Although, in a somewhat cir-
cuitous fashion, section 3583(d) provides that the court may dispense with, 
or decrease, the drug test condition.165  Section 3583(d) also allows the 
court to order any number of conditions specified in section 3563(b).166  
These are numerous, and include paying restitution to victims, undergoing 
medical or psychiatric treatment, and respecting prohibitions on visiting 
certain places or people.167  However, the discretionary condition must 
meet certain criteria before the court may require it.168 
First, the condition must “reasonably relate[ ]” to section 3553 factors 
(a)(1)—the offense’s nature and circumstances and the defendant’s history 
 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 159. See id.  Section 3583 points to most, but not all of the factors in § 3553(a). 
 160. See supra notes 123, 125-26 and accompanying text. 
 161. § 3583(c). 
 162. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 163. § 3583(d). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See § 3563(b)(2), (6), (9). 
 168. See § 3583(d). 
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and characteristics—as well as (a)(2)(B)-(C)—the need for the sentence to 
“afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” protect the public from 
the defendant and provide him or her with “needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most ef-
fective manner.”169  Second, the condition must involve “no greater depri-
vation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” for section 3553(a)(2)(B)-
(C) purposes.170 
2. The Right to Appeal 
Under section 3742, the defendant and the government both have the 
right to appeal conditions of supervised release and have the court modify 
them or revoke or terminate the supervised release altogether under section 
3583(e).171  Section 3583(g) mandates revocation of supervised release if a 
defendant possesses a firearm, refuses to comply with drug testing, or tests 
positive for drugs more than three times in a year.172  Revocation results in 
the defendant serving all or part of his or her supervised release term in 
prison.173 
3. Termination, Modification, and Revocation 
Section 3583(e) gives the court discretion to terminate the defendant’s 
supervised release as no longer necessary, or to modify the conditions or 
revoke the term for a violation of a condition of release, provided the court 
considers the same section 3553(a) factors required to impose supervised 
release conditions in the first place.174  Before modifying a term of super-
vised release in any way unfavorable to the defendant—any extension of 
supervised release is considered unfavorable—the court must conduct a 
hearing at which the defendant has a right to a lawyer.175  Moreover, when-
ever a defendant is held in custody for violating a condition of supervised 
release, he or she has the right to a “prompt preliminary hearing” to deter-
mine whether there is probable cause to believe that the violation oc-
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  Third, the condition must also be consistent with any pertinent policy statements 
that the Sentencing Commission issues. Id. (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006), which 
gives the Commission the authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines and policy state-
ments concerning how to apply the guidelines and use revocation and modification of pro-
bation powers). 
 171. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3), (b)(3); see also supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 172. § 3583(g); see also supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 173. § 3583(e)(3). 
 174. § 3583(e); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(c) (providing rules on hearings for revok-
ing or modifying probation and supervised release). 
 175. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b); Baer, Jr., supra note 107, at 282-83. 
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curred.176  A hearing is mandatory before revocation.177  The judge may 
delegate supervised release revocation proceedings to a magistrate judge, 
with the consent of the parties.178 
4. Probation Officers’ Duties 
Section 3603 lists the duties of probation officers, charging them with 
informing those on supervised release of the conditions which they must 
respect179 and to “keep informed . . . as to the conduct and condition of a 
. . . person on supervised release, and report his conduct and condition to 
the sentencing court,”180 as well as reporting to the judge the defendant’s 
violation of his or her terms of supervised release.181  Section 3603 also re-
quires that probation officers “bring about improvements in [the defen-
dant’s] conduct and condition.”182  The section ends by allowing probation 
officers to “perform any other duty that the court may designate.”183 
II.  CONFLICT 
A sentencing hearing thus determines far more than the number of years 
a defendant will spend in prison as punishment, as demonstrated in Parts 
I.B.2, I.B.3, and I.C.184  It is also when determines the theoretically rehabi-
litative conditions by which defendants will have to live post-release, as 
they begin to remake their lives.185  That is, the judge must predict the 
 
 176. Baer, Jr., supra note 107, at 286; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1) (promulgating 
rule for preliminary hearings in revocation proceedings). 
 177. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2) (“Unless waived by the person, the court must hold the 
revocation hearing within a reasonable time.”). 
 178. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3401(h). 
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 3603(1). 
 180. § 3603(2). 
 181. § 3603(7). 
 182. § 3603(3). 
 183. § 3603(10). 
 184. Although, as discussed in Part I.A.2, the judge, informed by the Guidelines, deter-
mines only the number of years the prisoner must serve.  The Bureau of Prisons is responsi-
ble for all other aspects of the term of imprisonment, from the type of housing in which it 
takes place to the kinds of restrictions it may place on his or her constitutional rights. 
 185. “Because conditions of supervised release always follow an individual’s release 
from prison, those who serve lengthy terms of incarceration are necessarily subject to condi-
tions of release that were first imposed many years before.” United States v. Hahn, 551 F.3d 
977, 984 (10th Cir. 2008); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence 
to a term of imprisonment . . . may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the 
defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.”); id. § 3583(d) (al-
lowing a judge to impose conditions of supervised release). 
Note that a judge may modify supervised release conditions at any time before the term ex-
pires. Id. § 3583(e); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(c) (giving rules for revoking or modify-
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needs of the defendant years or even decades ahead, and decide whether he 
or she will require drug treatment, anger management, or a prohibition 
from spending time with underage children.186  For financial crimes, judges 
also determine the amount of restitution the defendant should pay—despite 
not knowing what income a defendant will earn post-release, or whether he 
or she will be able to secure a job at all.187 
Because of the difficulty of predicting so far ahead, a number of district 
judges have imposed specific supervised release conditions, but worded 
them so that they are at the discretion of the probation officer.  Such dele-
gation allows the officer, who will monitor the defendant upon his or her 
release,188 to use his or her discretion about whether the contemplated con-
dition is still appropriate. 
The split in authority thus does not involve cases in which the judge al-
lowed the probation officer to add a new condition to the defendant’s su-
pervised release.  Rather, the delegation at issue in these cases involves on-
ly the power to implement—or not—a condition that the judge described 
during sentencing.  Borrowing language from a Second Circuit case,189 Part 
III.B.1.a posits that these conditions are best understood as being contin-
gent on a specified behavior or characteristic of the defendant that will not 
be known until the term of supervised release begins.  For example, a dele-
gated mental health condition would be contingent on the defendant actual-
ly requiring mental health treatment post-incarceration, and a restitutionary 
condition would be contingent on the defendant’s ability to pay. 
Only the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have upheld this kind of delega-
tion.190  In their opinions, these courts tend to demonstrate a concern for the 
 
ing probation and supervised release).  For detailed information about how the supervised 
release statute works, see supra Part I.C. 
 186. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (listing conditions of supervised release that a judge may 
impose in his or her discretion); id. § 3553(a) (listing factors to which conditions of super-
vised release must reasonably relate); see also supra Part I.C. 
 187. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664; see also United States. v. Porter, 41 F.3d 68, 70-71 (2d Cir. 
1994) (stating that courts face a “dilemma” in setting restitution orders because “[d]istrict 
judges are not seers and cannot accurately predict a defendant’s economic future”). 
 188. See 18 U.S.C. § 3603; see also supra notes 179-183 and accompanying text. 
 189. United States v. Prescott, 360 F. App’x 209, 212 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Fenner, 600 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is 
no improper delegation where the district court does not disclaim ultimate authority for de-
ciding the appropriateness of treatment. . . . [T]he phrase ‘as approved by the probation of-
ficer’ does not indicate an abdication of responsibility, and nothing in the record suggests 
otherwise.”); United States v. Wynn, 553 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding condi-
tion that defendant “participate in mental health counseling (if so directed) under the super-
vision of the U.S. Probation Office”); United States v. Kerr, 472 F.3d 517, 523 (8th Cir. 
2006) (upholding condition stating that “[t]he defendant shall participate in a mental health 
evaluation and/or treatment program, as directed by his probation officer. This may include 
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pragmatic effects of delegation.191  While the opinions typically do not de-
vote much space to discussing the constitutional issues involved, many in-
voke the ultimate responsibility rule, which has constitutional roots.192  In 
contrast, the majority of U.S. Courts of Appeals have ruled such delegation 
impermissible.193  Espousing a literal interpretation of Article III,194 these 
courts find that allowing a non-Article III officer to determine whether or 
 
participation in a sex offender treatment program”); United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 
1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding condition that defendant receive health counseling “if 
his probation officer deemed it appropriate”); United States v. Smart, 472 F.3d 556, 559 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (upholding conditions relating to sex offender status that district court stated pro-
bation officer could cancel within its discretion); United States v. Huffman, 146 F. App’x 
939, 943 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding district court did not unconstitutionally delegate authority 
to require defendant to reside in a community corrections facility); United States v. Mark, 
425 F.3d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding condition that defendant “have no contact 
with, or reside with, any children under 18 years of age, including his own children, unless 
approved in advance and in writing by the probation office”). 
  A number of courts seem to favor delegation, grounding their reasoning in pragmat-
ic considerations, but have not actually ruled on the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 
603 F.3d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that condition requiring defendant to participate 
in a mental health program “as deemed necessary and approved by the probation officer” 
did not constitute plain error); United States v. Wayne, 591 F.3d 1326, 1336 (10th Cir. 
2010) (finding no error where the district court stated that “if the evaluation shows that Ms. 
Wayne needs treatment, then the probation office can request a modification of this super-
vised release condition and I will make a determination as to whether treatment will be re-
quired or not”); United States v. Warden, 291 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding it was 
not plain error to allow a probation officer to determine a defendant’s ability to pay for drug 
treatment). 
 191. For a discussion of the minority’s approach, see infra Part II.B; especially Part 
II.B.2, which provides an example of the trial judge’s “dilemma,” and II.B.4, which ex-
plores these courts’ analyses of the policy issues involved. 
 192. For a discussion of the constitutional roots of the ultimate responsibility rule, and the 
way in which the minority approach reappropriated that rule from the majority side, see in-
fra Parts II.A.1 and II.B.1. 
 193. See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 883 (9th Cir. 2005) (striking con-
dition allowing probation officer to determine maximum number of non-treatment drug tests 
to which defendant had to submit); United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (striking condition that defendant participate in mental health program “if and as 
directed by the probation office”) (per curiam); United States v. Meléndez-Santana, 353 
F.3d 93, 106 (1st Cir. 2003), overturned on other grounds by United States v. Padilla, 415 
F.3d 211, 223-24 (1st Cir. 2005) (striking condition of supervised release that authorized the 
probation officer to determine whether defendant needed to enroll in drug treatment pro-
gram in the event he tested positive for drugs as unconstitutional); United States v. Albro, 
32 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1994) (striking delegation of “manner of payment” to a probation 
officer because “the manner of payment should be recited in the [sentencing] order, rather 
than delegat[ed] . . . to the probation officer” (citing United States v. Mancuso, 444 F.2d 
691, 695 (5th Cir. 1971))); United States v. Porter, 41 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 194. For a discussion of the origins of Article III and delegation in congressional history 
and Supreme Court jurisprudence, see supra Part I.A.1. 
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not to impose a condition of supervised release violates the constitutional 
allocation of judicial power.195 
The majority non-delegation view heavily predominates.  Even the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have occasionally ruled with the majority against 
delegation.  Thus, while the Eighth Circuit otherwise embraces the prag-
matic approach,196 it produced United States v. Kent,197 one of the most-
cited cases on the majority side.198  The Ninth Circuit has ruled both 
ways.199  Cases in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, which are the most divided 
on the issue, have featured strong dissents.200  The Sixth Circuit hews to the 
non-delegation line, but does allow parole officers to decide some issues, 
such as setting defendants’ post-incarceration restitution schedules,201 
 
 195. For a discussion of the majority’s ultimate responsibility rule, see infra Part II.A.1. 
 196. See, e.g., United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Condi-
tions delegating limited authority to non judicial officials such as probation officers are 
permissible so long as the delegating judicial officer retains and exercises ultimate responsi-
bility.”); United States v. Cooper, 171 F.3d 582, 586 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding condition 
that defendant participate in testing and treatment for drug and alcohol abuse “as directed 
by” probation officer); United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 780 (8th Cir. 1999) (uphold-
ing condition that defendant attend and pay for diagnostic evaluation, counseling, or treat-
ment as directed by probation officer); United States v. Iversen, 90 F.3d 1340, 1344 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (upholding condition giving probation officer authority to order psychiatric 
treatment); see also United States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289, 290 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(upholding probation officer’s authority to force defendant to attend programs for drug and 
alcohol use, to search defendant’s premises, vehicle, or person for alcohol or controlled sub-
stances without a warrant, and to make defendant submit to chemical testing for alcohol or 
drugs in his body). But see United States v. Rhone, 535 F.3d 812, 814-15 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(striking delegation of “legal determination” of whether defendant qualified as a sex offend-
er based on his prior juvenile convictions under the Adam Walsh Act, which imposes a 
mandatory supervised release condition). 
 197. United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding “that the lower 
court improperly delegated a judicial function to [the defendant’s] probation officer when it 
allowed the officer to determine whether [the defendant] would undergo counseling”). 
 198. See, e.g., Rhone, 535 F.3d at 815; United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Heath, 419 F.3d at 1315; United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 
881 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 199. Compare United States v. Bowman, 175 F. App’x 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2006) (allow-
ing probation officer to decide whether defendant could spend unsupervised time with his 
son and grandson), and United States v. Fellows, 157 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(same), with Stephens, 424 F.3d at 880 (reversing a condition allowing the probation officer 
to set the defendant’s maximum number of drug tests). 
 200. See Stephens, 424 F.3d at 885; Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 
2001). 
 201. See Weinberger, 268 F.3d at 359 (holding that district judges may delegate to the 
probation office the “rate” of installment restitution payments, so long as the court sets the 
total amount of restitution that defendant must pay); United States v. Gray, No. 95-1832, 
1997 WL 413663, at *4 (6th Cir. July 17, 1997) (same); United States v. Ferguson, No. 95-
1629, 1996 WL 571142, at *5 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1996) (same). 
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which other courts in the majority do not allow.202  The majority view pre-
vails in the First,203 Second,204 Third,205 Fourth,206 Seventh207 and Eleventh 
Circuits.208 
Before exploring the differences between the two approaches, it is im-
portant to note that both sides do allow some delegation: all courts to ad-
dress the issue have agreed that the judge may delegate purely administra-
tive tasks to probation officers, such as deciding which drug treatment 
center a defendant must attend if the judge has ordered drug treatment as a 
condition.209 
 
 202. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 203. See United States v. Meléndez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93, 101 (1st Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Allen, 312 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 2002) (ruling that judges may not delegate the 
decision to require mental health counseling to a probation officer). 
 204. The Second Circuit is different from other majority circuits.  First, in that its rule, 
first expressed in United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001), is not clearly 
constitutional.  Second, in that some more recent cases appear to allow delegation. Compare 
United States v. Kieffer, 257 F. App’x 378, 381 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is an impermissible 
delegation to allow a probation officer the discretion to determine whether defendants can 
go to . . . places [where children congregate].”), United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 130 
(2d Cir. 2005) (“[A]lthough it would be proper for the district court to postpone determining 
whether a special condition is necessary, the district court may not improperly delegate this 
determination to the probation office.”), and United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (calling condition requiring defendant to “participate in a mental health interven-
tion only if directed to do so by his probation officer” impermissible), with United States v. 
Prescott, 360 F. App’x 209, 212 (2d Cir. 2010) (upholding condition where “the district 
court expressly retained the authority to shorten the defendant’s term of supervised re-
lease”), and United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding condi-
tion prohibiting defendant from visiting areas where children are likely to congregate with-
out prior approval from the probation office). 
 205. See United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (ruling 
that judges may not constitutionally delegate the decision to require mental health counsel-
ing to a probation officer). 
 206. See United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 207. See United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A] district court . . . 
must itself impose the actual condition requiring participation in a sex offender treatment 
program.”). 
 208. See United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); 
United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that giving a proba-
tion officer the authority to set a restitution schedule is improper delegation of a core judi-
cial function); United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A court 
may not delegate a judicial function to a probation officer.  Such a delegation would violate 
Article III of the United States Constitution.”). 
 209. The Eleventh Circuit stated the majority’s rule on administrative delegation suc-
cinctly: “To determine if a court improperly delegated the judicial authority of sentencing, 
we have drawn a distinction between the delegation to a probation officer of ‘a ministerial 
act or support service’ and ‘the ultimate responsibility’ of imposing the sentence.” United 
States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bernardine, 237 F.3d at 
1283). 
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Some majority non-delegation courts have justified this stance by noting 
the special role that probation officers play in the judicial system.  In the 
words of the Tenth Circuit: 
Delegations of authority to probation officers may be less likely to be 
constitutionally problematic than those involving other officials because 
probation officers, while not judicial officers, are statutorily bound to 
serve within the jurisdiction and under the direction of the appointing 
court.  They function as an arm of the court, and the Sentencing Guide-
lines themselves entrust many correctional decisions to their discretion.  
. . . As a practical matter, moreover, many district courts must rely on 
probation services to ensure the efficient administration of justice in crim-
inal cases.210 
 
  The courts tend to agree that choosing a treatment center is an administrative task, 
and thus delegable. See, e.g., Pruden, 398 F.3d at 250-51 (holding that, while probation of-
ficers do require “some discretion in dealing with their charges,” that discretion should be 
limited to allowing the officer to select a treatment program and coordinate the timing of the 
defendant’s participation); United States v. Tulloch, 380 F.3d 8, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2004) (giv-
ing probation officer discretion to order unlimited drug tests is an improper delegation; al-
lowing the probation officer to determine the timing of tests is permissible administrative 
task); United States v. Meléndez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93, 103 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
while courts need not become involved in details such as scheduling tests, Congress as-
signed the courts the responsibility of stating the maximum number of tests to be performed 
or to set a range; they may not vest probation officers with the discretion to order an unli-
mited number of drug tests); United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 619 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding condition allowing probation officer to select type and extent of treatment for 
sex offender); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding no imper-
missible delegation where the district court intended only to delegate to probation officer the 
details of therapy, including selection of provider and schedule of treatment). 
  However, there is a split on the issue of restitution within the majority of courts that 
prohibit delegation.  Some non-delegation courts do allow the judge to delegate to probation 
officers the rate at which defendants must pay their restitution.  These include the Sixth, 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.  Others do not even permit that amount of delegation, includ-
ing the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits. Compare Weinberger v. United States, 
268 F.3d 346, 359 (6th Cir. 2001) (allowing delegation of rate to probation officer), United 
States v. Gray, No. 95-1832, 1997 WL 413663, at *4 (6th Cir. July 17, 1997) (same), United 
States v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1528 n.25 (11th Cir. 1997) (same), United States v. Fergu-
son, No. 95-1629, 1996 WL 571142, at *5 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1996) (same), United States v. 
Stinson, 97 F.3d 466, 468 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996) (same), United States v. Barany, 884 F.2d 
1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1989) (same), and United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 642 (9th Cir. 
1988) (same), with United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 681, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1999), United 
States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 78 (4th Cir. 1996), United States v. Yahne, 64 F.3d 1091, 1097 
(7th Cir. 1995), United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1995), United States v. 
Kassar, 47 F.3d 562, 568 (2d Cir. 1995), and United States v. Albo 32 F.3d 173, 174 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 
 210. United States v. Huffman, 146 F. App’x 939, 944-45 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing United States v. York, 357 
F.3d 14, 22 n.6 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
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In sum, even the majority non-delegation approach appreciates that pro-
bation officers are so entwined in the post-Sentencing Reform Act criminal 
system that disentangling their role from that of Article III judges is no 
easy task.  The Tenth Circuit’s analysis expresses the complex issues that 
make adhering closely to a literal reading of Article III so difficult,211 espe-
cially when it comes to issues of punishment, which do not fit neatly within 
one branch of government in the separation of powers scheme.212  When 
Congress adds supervised release into the mix—with its hybrid punitive 
and rehabilitative purposes and accordingly ambiguous role for probation 
officers, as shown in Part I.B—it is perhaps not surprising that courts have 
disagreed on the proper approach to the sentencing judge’s supervised re-
lease dilemma. 
A. The Majority Approach: Article III Literalism 
The majority of U.S. Courts of Appeals hold that Article III limits the 
functions that judges may delegate to probation officers.213  These courts 
do not allow a judge to set a condition of supervised release at sentencing 
with the caveat that the probation officer has discretion to implement it or 
not.  Because of the importance these circuits accord the constitutional as-
pect of their holdings, policy implications are secondary or non-existent in 
most of the opinions.214 
1. The Ultimate Responsibility Rule: United States v. Johnson 
In 1995, United States v. Johnson215 was one of the first cases to address 
the delegation issue.  The analytical framework that it established for the 
delegation “problem”216 has proven influential in the cases that have fol-
lowed.217 
Johnson ruled impermissible a condition of supervised release that al-
lowed a probation officer to “appropriately” adjust Victoria Johnson’s resti-
tution payments between a court-established $6,000 minimum and $35,000 
 
 211. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 212. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 213. See infra note 193. 
 214. For a discussion of the factual issues that arise with the majority’s approach, see in-
fra Parts II.A.1-2.  For a discussion suggesting that some policy concerns may lie behind the 
majority’s approach, see infra Part II.A.3. 
 215. 48 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 216. The court’s exact phrase is “[t]he problem is a difficult one.” Id. at 809. 
 217. See, e.g., United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Butler, 297 F.3d 505, 518 (6th 
Cir. 2002); see also infra Part II.B.1. 
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maximum to be paid in installments of at least $100 per month, depending 
on her ability to pay.218  According to the government’s brief, the district 
judge had based his estimates on a prediction that Johnson’s prison sen-
tence would not hamper her ability to find a job because of its short dura-
tion, her level of education, and her youth.219 
The Fourth Circuit expressed sympathy for the trial judge’s position.  It 
found the order “understandably fashioned” to address the problem that 
Johnson’s future earnings could not be “accurately forecasted at the time of 
sentencing—particularly when [she] faced a prison term of almost four 
years and supervised release of five years.”220  The Court noted that “fixing 
an inflexible amount of payment at the time of sentencing would be peril-
ous at best.”221  Finally, it acknowledged that, “to remain efficient,” district 
courts “must be able to rely as extensively as possible on the support ser-
vices of probation officers.”222 
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the statute’s grant of authority to the 
court to fix the terms of restitution “must be read as exclusive because the 
imposition of a sentence, including any terms for . . . supervised release, is 
a core judicial function.”223  Johnson cited the 1916 Supreme Court case Ex 
parte United States for this proposition.224  That case noted that “the right 
to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the 
punishment provided by law is judicial.”225  In doing so, it ruled the custom 
of federal judges sentencing defendants to probation rather than jail or pris-
on unconstitutional when Congress had not explicitly passed legislation 
permitting that practice.226 
Arguably, Johnson mischaracterized Ex parte United States’ statement 
in two ways.  First, Johnson seems to have taken a leap by including the 
imposition of supervised release terms—which, as discussed in Part I.B.2, 
Congress did not, in theory, intend to be punitive—in Ex parte United 
States’ constitutionally judicial category of imposing punishment. 
 
 218. Johnson, 48 F.3d at 807 (quoting the May 25, 1994 order of restitution of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina).  The maximum amount was 
actually $35,069.10. Id. 
 219. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, Johnson, 48 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-5472), 
1994 WL 16046729, at *10. 
 220. Johnson, 48 F.3d at 809. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 808. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41 (1916) (emphasis added). 
 226. Id. at 52. 
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Second, Johnson uses the word “exclusive,” but the notion of exclusivity 
does not seem to be present in Ex parte United States.227  The Court’s deci-
sion concerned the way in which judicial power was encroaching on the 
legislature’s sphere, and was not concerned with the ways in which other 
branches might have infringed upon judicial authority.  Moreover, as dis-
cussed in Part I.A.2 above, in 1916, the judiciary would have shared au-
thority over sentencing with the Parole Office, then a branch of the execu-
tive, and would have deferred to prison authorities over the way in which 
the defendant would serve his or her sentence.  Thus, it is doubtful that Ex 
parte United States would have considered sentencing to be a “core judicial 
function,” as Johnson held.228  Nonetheless, Johnson ruled supervised re-
lease conditions “non-delegable,”229 including not only the amount of resti-
tution, but also the number of installments and their timing.230 
Johnson echoed the language of the early major Supreme Court delega-
tion cases in support of its rule.231  Oddly, however, it did not cite the 
Court’s more recent, post-Northern Pipeline cases, which emphasize flex-
ibility and are reluctant to “unduly constrict Congress’ ability to take 
needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers.”232  Instead, 
Johnson relied on the ambiguous “essential attributes of judicial power”233 
idea without further elaboration.  It did so despite the fact that this idea had 
proven particularly amorphous in Supreme Court jurisprudence: permitting 
delegation in Crowell, forbidding it in Northern Pipeline, and allowing it 
once again in the post-Northern Pipeline cases.234 
In sum, Johnson acknowledged the “perilous” difficulties that a sentenc-
ing judge faces in imposing supervised release, as well as the need for dis-
 
 227. Johnson, 48 F.3d at 808; see also Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. at 41-42 (discuss-
ing inherent judicial power). 
 228. Johnson, 48 F.3d at 809. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 809 n.9 (citing Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
U.S. 50, 76-87 (1982) (finding delegation unconstitutional if “essential attributes of the 
judicial power” are not retained in an Article III court); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 
667, 683 (1980) (holding that delegation appropriate “so long as the ultimate decision is 
made by the district court”); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (delegation appro-
priate if “reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters of law provide[s] for 
the appropriate exercise of the judicial function”)). 
For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s delegation jurisprudence, see supra Part I.A.1. 
 232. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); see also 
supra Part I.A.1. 
 233. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.  The exact quotation is “the essential attributes of the 
judicial power.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 234. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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trict courts to rely on probation officers in order to remain efficient.235  
However, it ruled against allowing district courts to rely on probation offic-
ers to solve the problem of predicting what restitution payment would be 
fair both to the defendant and the victim.  The reason the Court provided 
was not the potential for abuse by the probation officer—section 3742 
guards against such abuse by allowing defendants to appeal to the court.236 
Rather, the decision rested on an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence that seems flawed in three respects.  First, Johnson ruled that 
only the judiciary may constitutionally impose a sentence, which includes 
conditions of supervised release.  However, Ex parte United States used the 
word “punishment” not “sentence.”237  Given Congress’ and the Sentencing 
Commission’s intent that supervised release serve a rehabilitative purpose, 
it is not clear that Johnson should have considered supervised release con-
ditions part of the judiciary’s inherent jurisdiction.  Second, even if John-
son was correct in that regard, it is not clear that sentencing is the exclusive 
preserve of the judiciary, given the judiciary’s long history of yielding to 
the executive concerning the sentence that defendants actually serve. 
Third, even if Johnson was right that imposing conditions of supervised 
release is an exclusive function, it is not clear that it is also non-delegable.  
Under the post-Northern Pipeline Supreme Court cases, a court should bal-
ance Article III’s “values”—essentially, fair treatment of litigants—with 
the constitutional and practical values of the non-Article III scheme.238 
Johnson itself had acknowledged its rule’s practical difficulties and poten-
tial unfairness to the defendant and her victims, but had found no potential 
for unfairness in the delegation.  Thus, Johnson might well have found the 
condition permissible under post-Northern Pipeline delegation analysis 
alone.  Nonetheless, subsequent opinions on both sides of the issue have 
cited Johnson’s rule frequently, and none seems to have raised these is-
sues.239 
2. Policy Implications: United States v. Heath and United States v. 
Stephens 
United States v. Heath,240 an Eleventh Circuit case that uses Johnson’s 
rule,241 illustrates some of the tensions that can play out between the reali-
 
 235. See supra notes 220-222 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 237. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41 (1916); see also supra note 225 and accom-
panying text. 
 238. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 239. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 240. 419 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
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ties of supervised release and the ultimate authority rule.  Heath struck 
down a condition of supervised release that left it to the probation officer to 
decide whether the defendant had to participate in a mental health pro-
gram.242 
a. Heath Facts: Leeway, But Only So Much 
In 2001, James Kincaid Heath was about seven months into his five-year 
term of supervised release, following a seven-year prison sentence for 
crack cocaine distribution, when his probation officer filed a motion with 
the district court asking that it revise the release terms.243  She apparently 
believed that Heath was in need of psychiatric testing because he was “act-
ing out” and mentally unstable.244  The court modified Heath’s supervised 
release by adding the condition that, should his probation officer direct him 
to do so, he submit to a mental health evaluation at a particular facility.245  
Following his probation officer’s direction, Heath initially showed up at the 
facility for the evaluation, but did not follow up, to which the officer made 
no objection.246  Three years later, in 2004, the probation officer requested 
that Heath go for a “follow-up” evaluation at another mental health facili-
ty—presumably because Heath was again exhibiting symptoms of mental 
instability.247  When Heath did not attend, the officer filed a petition for re-
vocation of his supervised release, claiming Heath’s refusal to participate 
violated the 2001 mental health condition.248 
During the first of two revocation hearings, the judge “asked the proba-
tion officer if she could suggest a modification of Heath’s conditions that 
would address her concerns.”249  After the second hearing, the court did not 
grant revocation, but instead modified Heath’s terms of release a second 
time, requiring that the defendant “participate if and as directed by the pro-
bation office in . . . mental health programs.”250  In a decision that seems 
consonant with the rehabilitative aims of supervised release,251 the judge 
 
 241. See id. at 1315. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 1314. 
 244. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Heath, 419 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-
10175-CC), 2005 WL 3141115, at *7. 
 245. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1314. 
 246. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 243, at *6. 
 247. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 243; see also Heath, 419 F.3d at 1314. 
 248. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1314. 
 249. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, Heath, 419 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-10175-
CC), 2005 WL 3141116, at *5-6. 
 250. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1314. 
 251. See supra Parts I.B.1-2. 
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chose to support Heath’s mental health needs by amending his release con-
ditions, rather than using the punitive measure of revocation.252 
b. Heath Holding: An Impermissibly Ambivalent Sentence 
Heath appealed both the 2001 and 2004 modifications of his supervised 
release terms as unconstitutional delegations of a judicial function.253  The 
court devoted little space to its finding that the delegation of “the authority 
to make the ultimate decision of whether Heath had to participate at all” in 
a mental health evaluation violated Article III.254  The government itself 
had conceded the issue.255 
The main point of dispute was whether the violation affected Heath’s 
substantial rights, necessitating reversal.256  The Court found that reversal 
was necessary because his sentence would have been different but for the 
error: it would have been clear as to whether it required the mental health 
condition or not.257  Instead, the sentence was ambivalent on this point be-
cause the condition was discretionary.258  Rejecting the government’s con-
tention that, “had the district court recognized its mistake, it likely would 
have required Heath’s participation in a mental health program instead of 
delegating that authority,”259 the court rejoined that to “ignore this error” 
would be to leave “the ultimate determination of Heath’s sentence . . . in 
the hands of the probation office.”260 
The court’s analysis is striking in the way in which it glosses over the 
actual facts of the case to reach its conclusion that the district judge’s dele-
gation had a real effect on Heath’s sentence.  The facts show that, directly 
after each instance in which the probation officer expressed a need to se-
cure mental health counseling for Heath, the judge modified the terms of 
Heath’s supervised release to require treatment at the officer’s discretion.261  
Thus, the court’s finding that Heath’s sentence would have been different 
 
 252. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 243, at *6. 
 253. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1314; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 249, at *10.  The 
court, however, only reviewed the second modification, finding that Heath had not timely 
filed his appeal for the first. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1314 n.1. 
 254. See Heath, 419 F.3d at 1315.  Heath did not cite Johnson, but use of the phrase “ul-
timate decision” demonstrates its influence on the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 1314-16. 
 255. Id. at 1315; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 243, at *11. 
 256. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1315. 
 257. Id. at 1316. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id.; accord Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 248, at *15. 
 260. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1316. 
 261. See id. at 1314; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 249, at *3-9; Brief for De-
fendant-Appellant, supra note 244, at *3-6. 
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were it not for the delegation,262 is almost certainly untrue.  Had the court 
not delegated, it likely would have required Heath to attend treatment with-
out allowing the probation officer to relieve him of that responsibility if she 
felt it was no longer necessary.263  Given how adamant Heath’s probation 
officer seemed to be about his need for counseling, however, it seems like-
ly that he would have attended the counseling either way. 
Even if the case was different—for example, if Heath’s probation officer 
thought he was exhibiting symptoms of depression, but was unsure that he 
required intervention—a discretionary condition would not make Heath’s 
sentence ambivalent.  Rather, it would mean that the judge had personally 
agreed—at a sentencing hearing that is mandatory for imposing or modify-
ing supervised release conditions264—that Heath required counseling, but 
allowed the officer to refrain from imposing the condition contingent on his 
not exhibiting symptoms of severe depression.265  In other words, the sen-
tence would be clear, it would just hinge on a particular, specified need. 
Moreover, the facts indicate that the district judge did impose his own 
will over that of the probation officer—that is, that he did make the ulti-
mate determination.266  When Heath refused to attend mental health coun-
seling at the officer’s direction in 2004, she had petitioned the court to re-
voke Heath’s release and send him back to prison.267  Instead, the court 
chose the alternate course of modifying his supervised release to allow 
Heath to receive mental health treatment.268  Thus, the facts also do not 
support the court’s statement that delegation left the ultimate determination 
of Heath’s sentence in the hands of the probation officer. 
c. Narrow Tailoring and United States v. Stephens 
United States v. Stephens,269 an opinion from the Ninth Circuit, which is 
divided over the delegation issue,270 concerned a defendant sentenced to a 
year of prison and three years of supervised release for importing marijua-
na.271  The conditions of Antonio Stephens’ supervised release included an 
 
 262. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1316. 
 263. This was the government’s argument. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra Part I.C. 
 265. For a discussion of how delegated supervised release conditions are better unders-
tood as being contingent on particular behaviors of the defendant, see infra Part III.B.1.a. 
 266. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 267. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1314; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 243, at *5-6. 
 268. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1314; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 243, at *5-6. 
 269. 424 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 270. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 271. Stephens, 424 F.3d at 878. 
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initial test directly following his release from prison, and “at least two” 
subsequent drug tests.  The majority held the condition impermissible.272 
i. Stephens Facts: A Struggle With Drug Use 
Stephens tested positive for cocaine four times within his first two 
months of supervised release.273  Upon the first positive test, his probation 
officer referred him to “relapse group counseling,” and Stephens enrolled 
in an outpatient drug treatment program.274  When he tested positive again, 
Stephens waived a hearing to modify his conditions of supervised release, 
the court approved the modification,275 and he enrolled into a residential 
treatment program.276  He successfully completed the program five months 
later in June.277  By October, however, Stephens tested positive for cocaine 
again,278 failing what his brief termed his probation officer’s “strict regi-
ment [sic] of drug testing.”279  The officer had him enroll in a sober living 
residence, but, she later alleged, he had trouble adjusting to the center.280  
He moved out within ten days, without notifying her.281 
A few weeks later, the probation officer filed a petition with the court for 
an arrest warrant for Stephens.282  She also filed a petition for revocation, 
alleging that he had violated his supervised release by testing positive for 
drugs four times since completing the first treatment program in June, fail-
ing to submit to four other drug tests, leaving the sober house without no-
tice and then failing to report to her, and failing to submit his monthly su-
pervision report.283  The implication is that Stephens went missing when he 
left the sober house. 
The judge granted the revocation, sentencing Stephens to four months in 
custody and two additional years of supervised release under the “same 
 
 272. Id. at 884. 
 273. Id. at 879. 
 274. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, Stephens, 424 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-50170), 
2004 WL 2203020, at *4. 
 275. Stephens, 424 F.3d at 879. 
 276. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 274, at *4. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Stephens, 424 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-
50170), 2004 WL 1762979, at *5. 
 280. Id. at *6. 
 281. Id. at *4. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 274, at *5. 
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conditions as previously imposed.”284  Those conditions were the subject of 
his appeal.285 
ii. Stephens Holding: A Struggle to Find the Limiting Principle 
The divided Stephens opinion debated what practical effects the majority 
rule would have on defendants’ sentences.  In particular, the debate cen-
tered on whether the rule would tend to increase the number of conditions 
placed on defendants post-incarceration.  Stephens held that the district 
court erred by leaving the maximum number of drug tests to the probation 
officer’s discretion.286  It stated: “Where, as here, a probation officer can of 
his own accord order a test, he is subjecting the defendant to the possibility 
of further criminal punishment. . . . [I]t is for the court to determine how 
many times a defendant may be placed in jeopardy of being tested.”287 
The dissent took issue with this reasoning.288  It argued that the rule 
“makes little sense” because, at sentencing, the district court is “not in a 
position to determine how many tests may be required for proper supervi-
sion.”289  As a policy matter, the dissent held that probation officers are ne-
cessary because district courts cannot logistically “monitor each defen-
dant’s situation and determine [his or her] supervision needs.”290  Thus, the 
dissent argued, Stephens “invites” sentencing courts to set a “sky-high” 
maximum number of drug tests, creating in practice additional, less-tailored 
post-release burdens on the defendant.291 
Addressing this critique, the majority posited that district judges would 
not likely make such “unprincipled determinations.”292  Yet, the next sen-
tence conceded that, “given an offender with serious predilections toward 
drug use, the district court will set the maximum number sufficiently high 
to give the probation officer flexibility in supervising the offender.”293  The 
majority concluded that “the key under the statute is that the sentencing 
court . . . make the penological decision of placing the offender in jeopardy 
of submitting to the tests.”294  Here, the implication is that placing an of-
 
 284. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 279, at *6. 
 285. Stephens, 424 F.3d at 878. 
 286. Id. at 883. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 885 (Clifton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 887. 
 291. Id.; see also id. at 884 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 292. Id. at 884 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
SCHRAA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
2011] DELEGATIONAL DELUSIONS 945 
fender in jeopardy of more penological measures than he or she needs is 
constitutionally acceptable—so long as a judge makes those decisions.  
Heath’s main concern is thus not with limiting supervised release condi-
tions that it considers punitive, but with ensuring that they are judge-
imposed. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Heath, like Johnson,295 describes super-
vised release conditions as punitive, despite the legislative history and 
Guidelines’ stated mission that these conditions be considered rehabilita-
tive.296  Yet, the facts show that Stephens did have a serious drug abuse 
problem, and suggest that his probation officer’s strict regimen of drug 
treatment may have had some rehabilitative success, despite his subsequent 
relapse and disappearance. 
3. Protecting Defendants’ Rights: United States v. Pruden 
Another factor may be at play in some of the majority cases, however.  
United States v. Pruden297 illustrates the way in which the constitutional 
rule may protect defendants’ rights by limiting supervised release condi-
tions that could be needlessly burdensome.  The Third Circuit in Pruden 
struck down a condition because it delegated to the defendant’s probation 
officer the decision of whether to require mental health treatment.298 
a. Facts: An Extraneous Condition 
The district court had sentenced Calvin Edward Pruden on a gun charge 
to nearly two years in prison, followed by three years of supervised release 
with a number of conditions.299  The district judge included the mental 
health condition, even though the prosecution had not requested it, nor had 
the probation office noted any mental health problems in Pruden’s presen-
tence report.300  At sentencing, the judge told Pruden that the conditions of 
supervised release “are put on there for one reason: To give you the help 
you need when you get back on the street.  They’re not punitive.  They’re 
assistance.  I hope you take them that way, sir.”301 
 
 295. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 296. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 297. 398 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
 298. Id. at 250. 
 299. Id. at 245. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 245. 
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b. Holding: Two Legal Reasons to Strike the Condition 
Pruden noted of this exchange: “We are not unappreciative of the good 
intentions of the District Court . . . [i]n its desire to try to convert Pruden 
into a constructive member of society.”302  However, the court held that the 
mental health condition was nonetheless unacceptable for two reasons, one 
statutory and the other constitutional.  First, the court noted that the super-
vised release statute dictates that conditions involve “no greater deprivation 
of liberty than is reasonably necessary.”303  Because Pruden had no history 
of mental illness, the court found that the mental health condition violated 
that rule.304  Interestingly, Pruden’s brief raised only this tailoring issue, not 
the delegation issue.305  Moreover, in its reply, the government argued the 
fact that the mental health condition was “at the discretion of [Pruden’s] 
probation officer” was a reason the court should uphold it.306  It demon-
strated how “narrowly tailored” the condition was, serving “merely as an 
additional mechanism for corrective treatment available to the probation 
officer if he or she, in his or her profession judgment, deems it neces-
sary.”307 
Thus, neither brief raised the delegation issue.  The court nonetheless in-
cluded a sizeable discussion of delegation in its opinion, ruling that a “pro-
bation officer may not decide the nature or extent of the punishment im-
posed upon a probationer.”308  The court struck down the mental health 
condition on that basis alone.309  Pruden expressly rejected a statutory ra-
tionale for its rule, which it held stemmed from Article III.310 
Additionally, Pruden indicated that two policy considerations weighed 
heavily against such conditions: first, imposing conditions of supervised 
release creates significant monetary costs on the probation system,311 and, 
 
 302. Id. at 249-50. 
 303. Id. at 249 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) (2006)). 
 304. Id. at 250. 
 305. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 17-21, Pruden, 398 F.3d 241 (No. 04-1863); Reply 
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1-5, Pruden, 398 F.3d 241 (No. 04-1863). 
 306. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 19-24, Pruden, 398 F.3d 241 (No. 04-1863). 
 307. Id. at 19-20. 
 308. United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Ex 
parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916); United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1078 
(8th Cir. 2000)). 
 309. Id. at 251. 
 310. Id. at 250 (ruling that the limitation on probation officers’ authority “is of constitu-
tional dimension, deriving from Article III’s grant of authority over ‘cases and controver-
sies’” to the courts). 
 311. Id. (noting that, as of September 2004, “a total of 10,216 post-conviction offenders 
received contracted mental health treatment services paid for by the Probation Office,” and 
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second, that those costs “can result in sanctions on the defendant for viola-
tion of the condition,” such as a return to prison.312 
As the parties’ failure to raise the delegation issue indicates, the Third 
Circuit had not ruled on delegation prior to Pruden.  However, there is cir-
cuit precedent supporting the notion that courts need to prevent probation 
officers from treading on defendants’ rights.  In United States v. Loy,313 the 
Third Circuit struck a condition of supervised release prohibiting the de-
fendant from possessing pornography.314  The court found the condition 
void for vagueness because it gave Ray Loy’s probation officer the power 
to decide what materials constituted pornography.315  Although Loy had a 
different constitutional basis than Pruden—in the First Amendment, rather 
than in Article III316—the rationale of limiting probation officer discretion 
because it might potentially harm a defendant is similar to that in Pruden. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), which man-
dates that supervised release conditions “involve[ ] no greater deprivation 
of liberty than is reasonably necessary,” provides protection for defendants 
from over-zealous judges and probation officers,317 as Pruden itself illu-
strated by striking the mental health condition purely on statutory grounds 
before moving on to the delegation issue.318 
B. The Minority Pragmatic Approach 
The pragmatic approach allows judges to delegate the decision whether 
or not to implement conditions of supervised release to parole offices.  
These circuits tend to justify their positions with policy rationales, focusing 
on the logistical feasibility of overseeing nuanced supervisory conditions, 
and positing that limited parole officer discretion may tend to create better 
tailored supervised release terms than the judge is capable of setting at sen-
tencing. 
 
that the “total mental health expenditures ran to $12,926,006, or some $1,265 per offend-
er”). 
 312. Id. 
 313. 237 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 314. Id. at 265. 
 315. Id.  The condition prohibited Loy from possessing “all forms of pornography, in-
cluding legal adult pornography.” Id. at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 316. Id. at 253. 
 317. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) (2006). 
 318. Pruden, 398 F.3d at 249 (citing id. § 3583(d)(2) (2006)); see supra notes 303-304 
and accompanying text. 
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1. Recasting United States v. Johnson’s “Ultimate Responsibility” 
The minority approach adopted the majority’s constitutionally rooted ul-
timate responsibility rule as its own, finding that it justifies the minority 
courts’ more permissive holdings.  Most of the minority Courts trust that 
the judge will, in practice, retain final authority over a defendant’s condi-
tions of supervised release.  As noted in Part I.C.3 above, 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e) and § 3742 allow defendants to appeal supervised release condi-
tions to the district court, so that ultimate responsibility in a judge is essen-
tially statutorily guaranteed. 
One example of this approach is Bowman,319 the case described in the 
introduction to this Note, concerning a sex offender whose supervised re-
lease contained a delegated prohibition on being able to see his son and 
grandson unsupervised.320  Bowman ruled that, if the district court express-
ly retains final authority to modify a supervised release condition, it is legi-
timate under 18 U.S.C. § 3583.321  However, while Bowman adhered to the 
letter of the law in Johnson, in spirit it differed completely.  Bowman 
upheld the delegation of a supervision condition in a way that neither of 
those cases likely would have. 
Bowman found that the sentencing transcript indicated that the district 
court had retained final authority over the discretionary condition.322  Inte-
restingly, however, it found this even though the government had conceded 
in its brief that the record was “somewhat confused as to whether the pro-
bation officer would make the final determination as to whether unsuper-
vised contact . . . would be allowed without further court intervention or 
whether the modification would have to be implemented by the court.”323  
Bowman was apparently satisfied that the district court would, in practice, 
intervene independently should a dispute arise.  In fact, it pointed to the 
fact that Bowman could seek relief from the district court should the proba-
tion officer “arbitrarily or unfairly” deny him permission.324  Thus, Bow-
man indicates that the fact that supervised release conditions are appealable 
may make the Johnson ultimate responsibility rule a nullity. 
 
 319. 175 F. App’x 834 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 320. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. 
 321. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006); Bowman, 175 F. App’x at 837 (citing United States v. Ste-
phens, 424 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2005)).  The court explicitly ruled on the delegation is-
sue, though it might have avoided it altogether, a stance urged by the government. See Brief 
for Plaintiff-Appellee at 28, Bowman, 175 F. App’x 834 (No. 05-30106). 
 322. Bowman, 175 F. App’x at 838. 
 323. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 3, at *10. 
 324. Bowman, 175 F. App’x at 838; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) (stating that a district 
court may terminate a term of supervised release “if it is satisfied that such action is war-
ranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice”). 
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Other courts in the minority have reappropriated the Johnson rule with 
equal ease.  The Eighth Circuit did so in United States v. Mickelson,325 
upholding two conditions to Thomas Mickelson’s supervised release term 
following his sentence for receiving child pornography: one which allowed 
the probation office to track him on a GPS system at its discretion, and a 
second which required him to receive mental health counseling should his 
probation officer deem it appropriate.326  Mickelson cited United States v. 
Kent327—the non-delegation outlier in the Eighth Circuit, which itself had 
cited to Johnson328—for its rule that 18 U.S.C. § 3583 allows judges to del-
egate “limited” authority to non-judicial officials, “so long as the delegat-
ing judicial officer retains and exercises ultimate responsibility.”329 
2. Policy Rationale: Delegation Limiting Supervised Release Conditions 
Unlike the majority court opinions, the minority courts do tend to dis-
cuss policy rationales for their holdings.  Thus, Mickelson stated that “flex-
ible conditions” likely serve a defendant’s “interests” because they can be 
“tailored to meet his specific correctional needs.”330  The court noted with 
approval the district court’s statement that it intended to “limit[] conditions 
to those actually needed,” which a probation officer’s input on Mickelson’s 
need for mental health counseling would make easier.331  In addition, 
Mickelson noted that prohibiting judges from delegating would lead to lo-
 
 325. 433 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Wynn, 553 F.3d 1114, 1120 
(8th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Smart, 472 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Kerr, 472 F.3d 517, 524 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 
1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 2006)) (“[W]e have upheld a district court’s limited delegation of au-
thority to a probation officer where the court gives no affirmative indication that it would 
not retain ultimate authority over all of the conditions of supervised release.”). 
 326. Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1056-57. 
 327. 209 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2000).  Kent struck a condition of supervised release that 
allowed the probation officer authority to decide whether the defendant needed to undergo 
psychiatric treatment. Id.  While the Eighth Circuit generally espouses the minority permis-
sive rule, Kent is an exception in that it supports the majority non-delegation approach. See 
supra notes 196-198 and accompanying text. 
 328. Kent, 209 F.3d at 1078 (citing United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808-09 (4th 
Cir. 1995)). 
 329. Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1056-57 (citing Kent, 209 F.3d at 1078-79); see also Brief 
for Respondent-Appellee at 25, Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050 (No. 05-2324) (arguing that five 
previous Eighth Circuit cases upheld conditions of supervised release similar to the one at 
issue). 
 330. Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1057 (citing United States v. Cooper, 171 F.3d 582, 587 (8th 
Cir. 1998)). 
 331. Id. 
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gistical problems because trial courts “cannot be expected to police every 
defendant to the extent that a probation officer is capable of doing.”332 
For its part, Bowman cited research indicating that over ninety percent of 
reported child molestations occur within the family to bolster its decision 
not to strike the supervised release condition that prohibited Bowman from 
visiting his son and grandson unsupervised.333  It is unclear how a majority 
court would rule in such a situation.  Presumably, it would strike the condi-
tion as violative of Article III.  However, the potential for harm to young 
children would, in such an instance, perhaps give pause. 
III.  RESOLUTION 
This Part argues that the Supreme Court should rule that trial judges may 
delegate the decision of whether or not to implement particular supervised 
release conditions to probation officers on constitutional and policy 
grounds.  Part III.A finds support for delegation in the Constitution, and in 
Supreme Court precedent pertaining to the larger delegation question and 
to the judiciary’s relationship to prison authorities.  Part III.B illustrates the 
policy reasons that make ruling in favor of delegation a better result for de-
fendants and the public. 
A. Constitutional Reasons to Delegate 
1. Literally Constitutional 
Even under a strict literal reading of Article III, the limited delegation 
that is actually at issue in these supervised release cases should pass consti-
tutional muster.  As shown in Part I.A’s introduction, which discussed the 
ideas animating Article III’s life tenure and guaranteed salary mandates for 
the judiciary, the founders’ objective was to prevent federal judges from 
being beholden to any other branch of government.334  According to the 
Declaration of Independence, they felt unable to obtain true justice from 
judges under the colonial system because of the corrupting influence that 
King George III wielded over the entire judicial establishment.335 
 
 332. Id. (quoting Kent, 209 F.3d at 1079). 
 333. United States v. Bowman, 175 F. App’x 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Leonore 
M.J. Simon, Sex Offender Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 485, 490-92 (1999)). 
 334. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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The presidentially-appointed Sentencing Commission appears to have 
marred supervised release with a separation of powers problem.336  The ex-
ecutive may well wield excessive power over the scheme, resulting in a 
“tough on crime” bias against defendants in the federal criminal system.337  
It does not follow, however, that invalidating minimal delegations from tri-
al judges to probation officers will counter-balance the much larger and 
very different encroachment of the Executive on judicial power. 
The federal judiciary, including trial judges, appears dissatisfied with 
sentencing reform’s legacy.338  Thus, trial judges working on the front lines 
of the criminal justice system deserve some deference when they create so-
lutions to help protect defendants’ rights.  The cases discussed in Part II 
demonstrate that trial judges delegate particular conditions to probation of-
ficers out of a desire to balance the imposition of conditions they believe 
the defendant might require post-incarceration with the fear that they might 
be wrong about the defendant’s future needs—transforming a condition 
from a helpful intervention into a punitive restriction on liberty.  Thus, del-
egations to the probation officer are perhaps best understood as putting a 
small amount of counter-veiling pressure on the Executive’s intruding and 
excessively punitive influence on the judiciary. 
Moreover, these small delegations to the probation officer are, as the 
Tenth Circuit noted, “less likely to be constitutionally problematic” be-
cause probation officers “are statutorily bound to serve within the jurisdic-
tion and under the direction of the appointing court.”339  Lastly, these dele-
gations fundamentally treat the defendant fairly—or as fairly as possible 
within the supervised release scheme’s constraints.  Surely, a judge’s fair 
treatment of a defendant is the best and most important measure of whether 
a judicial action falls within the bounds of Article III.  The Supreme Court 
itself has said so in its post-Northern Pipeline delegation cases.340 
 
 336. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s and Rep-
resentative Rodino’s critiques of the effect of the Sentencing Commission on separation of 
powers). 
 337. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 236 (quoting Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Federal Criminal 
Sentencing Reform, 11 J. LEGIS. 218, 131 (1984)); see also supra note 129 and accompany-
ing text. 
 338. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 281-82 (citing Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. 
Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at 22) (“Within the federal judiciary, criticism 
[of the Sentencing Guidelines] has come from Republicans and Democrats, liberals and 
conservatives.”). 
 339. United States v. Huffman, 146 F. App’x 939, 944-45 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing United 
States v. York, 357 F. 3d 14 (1st Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and cita-
tion omitted); see also supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra Part I.A.1. 
SCHRAA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
952 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
2. In the Pipeline 
a. Plurality 
Northern Pipeline, the most recent Supreme Court delegation case that 
Johnson cited for its influential ultimate responsibility rule, was not the 
most recent one on which the Supreme Court had ruled.341  Nonetheless, 
supervised release delegation would pass Justice Brennan’s stringent plu-
rality standard. 
Justice Brennan wrote that the bankruptcy system, unlike the magistrate 
system, threatened the separation of powers because bankruptcy judges, 
while not of Article III status, enjoyed plenary jurisdiction reviewable only 
under clear error.342  He also maintained that even the availability of de no-
vo Article III court review was insufficient, on its own, to satisfy the ad-
junct test, as measured by the essential attributes of judicial power stan-
dard.343 
In the context of the limited authority parole officers enjoy under super-
vised release delegation—either to impose a particular condition of super-
vised release or to deem that the defendant does not in fact require that 
condition—their jurisdiction is far from being “plenary” or even akin to 
that lesser jurisdiction of referees in the old bankruptcy system.344  Moreo-
ver, because of the parole officer’s statutory obligation to “keep informed 
. . . as to the conduct and condition of a . . . person on supervised release, 
[to] report his conduct and condition to the sentencing court,” and to notify 
the court of any violation of his or her terms of supervised release,345 
judges, theoretically at least, stay attuned to the defendant’s case even 
without their formal section 3742 right to appeal.346 
Thus, a careful examination of the actual amount of delegation at issue 
reveals the extent to which probation officers truly serve as adjuncts to the 
court, as well as the extent to which the judges retain not only the “essen-
tial” attributes of judicial power, but indeed all of them.  The judge’s close 
involvement in Heath’s mental health issues, and his refusal to revoke his 
release, as Heath’s probation officer wanted, provide a good example of 
that relationship.  Therefore, these delegations satisfy even the Northern 
Pipeline plurality standard. 
 
 341. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 342. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 & n.5 (1982) 
(plurality opinion); see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
 343. Id. at 86 n.39; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
 345. 18 U.S.C. § 3603(2) (2006); see also supra Part I.C.4. 
 346. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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b. Dissent 
However, the more relevant Supreme Court delegation standard is not 
that contained in Justice’s Brennan’s Northern Pipeline plurality opinion, 
but in Justice White’s more influential dissent.  Had Johnson looked to a 
post-Northern Pipeline case,347 it is possible that it, and the many which 
followed in the majority of circuit courts, would have come out differently, 
perhaps avoiding this split altogether. 
The later approach involves a balancing test that evaluates Article III 
values against the practical and constitutional arguments for non-Article III 
adjudication—such as: (1) the importance of the right to be adjudicated; (2) 
the inherent fairness of the system in which the adjudication is conducted; 
(3) the extent to which Congress reserves the essential attributes of judicial 
power to Article III courts; (4) the extent to which the non-Article III forum 
exercises powers normally vested in Article III courts; and (5) the concerns 
that drove Congress to depart from Article III’s requirements.348 
Delegation in the context of supervised release preserves Article III val-
ues.  As examined above, (1) it provides a way to potentially decrease pu-
nishment (with the possible exception of restitutionary conditions, where 
delegation could in some cases decrease the fine, but might in others in-
crease it, although that would also be an increased remedy for victims).  
Because of the many opportunities for informal court review, through the 
probation officer’s statutorily-required updates349 and the conditions’ for-
mal appealability,350 (2) the system has strong procedural safeguards to as-
sure fairness.  In all, delegation is a fair means of dealing with an important 
right. 
Trial judges, rather than Congress, created the delegating scheme.  As 
examined in the paragraph directly above, as well as at the end of Part 
III.A.1.a above, (3) trial judges retain the essential attributes of judicial 
power because of the many opportunities judges have to oversee the proba-
tion officer’s actions.  As to (4), the extent to which a probation officer’s 
adjusting a condition of release is normally an Article III court responsibili-
ty, here, traditionally, a parole officer and not a judge would have been in 
charge not only of conditions of release, but also of the time of release.351  
Vesting judges with the responsibility for these conditions is new, and thus 
the tiny delegation back to probation officers does not disrupt traditional 
 
 347. These include Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), 
and Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). See supra Part I.A.1. 
 348. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 350. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 351. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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values.  Finally, (5) the concerns animating the trial judges are protecting 
the public, ensuring the efficient operation of the supervised release system 
and rehabilitating defendants by ensuring that former convicts receive 
needed help with issues that are prevalent among them, such as mental 
health problems or drug addiction, and that can lead to crime.352  These are 
also the stated concerns of supervised release,353 and, surely, the ideal of 
any criminal justice system, even the “tough on crime” conservative 
scheme created in the 1980s. 
In sum, Johnson’s faulty, but influential, analysis failed not only because 
it did not fully examine the Supreme Court’s delegation jurisprudence, but 
also, and especially, because it neglected to investigate the actual facts in-
volved—which all of the Supreme Court’s delegation opinions demand.  
Johnson features no analysis of the trial judge’s reasons for delegating to 
the probation officer.354  Nor does it engage in an examination of what 
power, in reality or by statute, the judge would retain over the supervised 
release condition that he or she delegates.355  This failure to investigate the 
facts resulted in a failure to correctly assess the scheme’s constitutionality.  
Delegation, within the limited context of supervised release, is not only 
constitutional, it also better serves the “Article III values” that Justice 
White rightly held to be the paramount constitutional concern. 
3. The Judicial Probation Officer and the Executive Prison Authority 
Finally, the majority approach’s concern about a delegation that involves 
only whether or not to implement a judicially-set condition of release seems 
out of place in comparison to the power over punishment that prison au-
thorities in the executive branch enjoy.356 
As shown in Part I.A.2, the Supreme Court holds that federal courts 
must give “deference” to prison authorities’ punitive decisions, such as 
placing an inmate in solitary confinement, or incarcerating them—even in 
defiance of the sentencing judge’s order—in a secure facility rather than a 
half-way house.  It is true that judges owe this deference due to “the diffi-
cult judgments concerning institutional operations” of prisons for important 
logistical and safety reasons357—it would not be possible for the judiciary 
to closely monitor every aspect of prison administration, and, even if it 
 
 352. See supra Part II. 
 353. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 354. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000). 
 355. See id. 
 356. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 357. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor 
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)); see also supra note 69. 
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were, the judiciary may well lack the institutional competence to keep pris-
ons safe.  It thus makes sense to keep this exception to the judiciary’s oth-
erwise exclusive oversight of punishment a narrow one. 
Nonetheless, the analogy is informative.  Like prison authorities, proba-
tion officers perform an important logistical function.  They keep abreast of 
the offenders’ behavior under the stated goal of ensuring their adjustment 
to post-incarceration life.358  Like prison authorities, probation officers 
have a unique and useful institutional competence, which comes from be-
ing closely involved in the offender’s post-incarceration life.  Thus, it 
makes sense to vest them with the power to decrease or adjust specified su-
pervised release conditions in a way that is generally helpful to offenders.  
Such limited delegation to probation officers fits within the narrow excep-
tion to the judiciary’s oversight of punishment. 
Moreover, delegation to probation officers is different from the judi-
ciary’s deference to prison authorities in that delegation is simply not defe-
rence.  Because of the continued oversight that judges provide offenders on 
supervised release, even when judges have delegated particular conditions, 
judges need never defer to the probation officer even once having dele-
gated.  Once again, the best example of this is Heath, where the probation 
officer sought to revoke Heath’s supervised release, but—at the statutorily-
mandated revocation hearing359—the judge disagreed and modified Heath’s 
mental health treatment condition a second time.360  Although there appears 
not to be much research on how available judicial oversight of supervised 
release is to defendants in practice, the cases in Part II anecdotally indicate 
that trial judges do hold hearings on supervised release matters frequently. 
Thus, although none of the courts to address the delegation issue ex-
plored the constitutional parameters of judicial oversight of punishment, 
that approach might have provided a second path—besides the Article III 
delegation path explored above in Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2—to finding del-
egation constitutional. 
B. Policy Reasons to Delegate 
This section posits that delegation is good policy, not only because it ad-
vances supervised release’s original goals, but also because it plays a role 
in ameliorating some of the problems that have arisen since its enactment. 
 
 358. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 359. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006); supra Part I.C. 
 360. See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
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1. The Original Goals of Supervised Release 
This section argues that delegation best serves three of the original goals 
behind supervised release: (a) truth in sentencing; (b) ensuring that judges 
and parole officers not work at cross-purposes; and (c) helping to rehabili-
tate offenders. 
a. A Sentence With No Surprises 
Delegation does not make a defendant’s life post-incarceration a mys-
tery, but rather makes the condition contingent on the defendant acting or 
not acting in a specified way.  As discussed in Part I.B.1, supervised release 
is the child of an alliance between the left and the right, both of which 
blamed unfettered judicial and probationary discretion for unpredictable 
sentences.361  The left was more concerned with the effects of the old inde-
terminate system’s unfairness on defendants, the right was more eager to 
see offenders serve longer sentences, but both were united in believing that 
the defendant and the public should know what the true sentence would be 
by the end of the sentencing hearing.362 
Heath best illustrates the way in which delegation makes a sentence con-
tingent, but not unclear.363  That case involved two mental health condi-
tions, one that the judge imposed early in Heath’s term of supervised re-
lease, which gave the probation officer the discretion to require Heath to be 
evaluated at a particular center, and a second imposed a few years later at a 
revocation hearing, which gave the probation officer the discretion to re-
quire Heath to participate in the mental health program of the officer’s 
choosing.364 
The court took issue with both conditions, holding that Heath’s sentence 
“certainly would have been different” but for the delegation pertaining to 
his conditions of supervised release because “the district court would have 
decided whether he had to participate in a mental health program, and that 
 
 361. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 362. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 363. One Second Circuit opinion appears to have adopted a similar understanding of de-
legated conditions.  See United States v. Prescott, 360 F. App’x 209 (2d Cir. 2010).  Pres-
cott involved a two-year term of supervised release which could only be reduced at the dis-
cretion of the probation officer. Id. at 212.  The court upheld the condition, stating that it did 
not “in any way ‘leave the issue of the defendant’s participation in [drug treatment] to the 
discretion of the probation officer.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 
(2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam)).  Rather, the court stated that the condition “left Prescott’s free-
dom entirely in his own hands: if he remained drug free after one year of supervision by the 
probation office, the district court would terminate the remaining term of supervised release; 
if he did not, he would remain under supervision for the full term.” Id. 
 364. See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
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decision would have been incorporated into his sentence.”365  With the del-
egation, the court felt that “Heath’s sentence reflects only that the probation 
office will determine whether Heath has to participate in such a pro-
gram.”366 
Here, the Court mischaracterized the actual effect of the court’s delega-
tion.  When the judge added the condition that Heath would need to seek 
evaluation at a mental health center only if the probation officer made him 
do so, that condition was perfectly clear: If Heath continued to “act out,” 
which was the reason that the officer petitioned the court for the first mod-
ification,367 the officer would make him obtain a mental health evaluation.  
If Heath no longer exhibited symptoms of mental instability, she would in 
all likelihood not do so.  Simply because a condition of supervised release 
is contingent on a specific event—such as displaying mental health prob-
lems—does not mean that it is arbitrary or that it holds any surprises for the 
defendant. 
The cases in Part II all featured equally clear conditions.  For example, 
in Stephens, the probation officer had the discretion to set the number of 
drug tests368—Stephens’ condition of supervised release was thus contin-
gent on his need for drug testing.  Presumably, if Stephens was no longer 
addicted to drugs by the time of his release from prison, his probation of-
ficer would have imposed fewer drug tests.  As examined in Part II.A.3, if 
the officer did impose those conditions capriciously, Stephens would al-
ways have the right to appeal to the district court.  In Johnson, the proba-
tion officer had the discretion to set the defendant’s restitution payments 
within a range of maximum amounts.369  This meant that the condition was 
contingent on her ability to pay restitution upon her release from prison.  In 
Bowman, the probation officer had the authority to allow the defendant to 
see his son and grandson without seeking permission beforehand.370  The 
condition was unambiguously contingent on whether or not he showed 
signs of posing a danger to them. 
Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion in Heath, delegation in the su-
pervised release context does not obfuscate the true content of a condition 
of supervised release.  Rather, it makes that condition contingent on specif-
ic behavior that indicates whether the defendant truly needs it or not.  The 
 
 365. United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also 
supra Parts II.A.2.a-b. 
 366. Heath, 419 F.3d at 1316. 
 367. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 248. 
 368. See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
 369. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 370. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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congressional parents of supervised release were concerned about indeter-
minate sentencing, but this kind of delegation does not implicate that prob-
lem.  Those on the left wanted to end unprincipled differences in treatment, 
and delegation actually tailors a defendant’s supervised release conditions 
to those she or he truly needs (or, in the case of restitution, can afford).  
Those on the right were concerned about coddling defendants, but, while 
delegation can serve to lessen the restrictions that a defendant on super-
vised release experiences, it does not do so unjustifiably.  Delegation in no 
way contravenes the purpose of reducing the unpredictability in sentencing 
that lay at the origin of the supervised release scheme. 
b. Removing the Strategy from Sentencing 
Related to the clarity in sentencing goal was a joint desire on the right 
and left to ensure that sentencing did not turn into a game in which the 
judge’s decisions were strategically made at the front-end to counter-
balance a guess as to what the parole officer might do on the back-end.371 
The cases discussed in Part II demonstrate that trial judges primarily in-
tend delegation as a tool to prevent a similar sort of speculative strategizing 
about the sentence on the part of the trial judge.  The discussion between 
the majority and the dissent in United States v. Stephens372 best illustrates 
the problem.373  In that case, the judge had sentenced Stephens to drug 
treatment and testing as conditions of supervised release, but left it to his 
probation officer to determine the maximum number of drug tests.374 
The dissent approved of this decision, noting that, at sentencing, the dis-
trict court is “not in a position to determine how many tests may be re-
quired for proper supervision” of the defendant.375  Because judges cannot 
logistically “monitor each defendant’s situation and determine [his or her] 
supervision needs,” the dissent wrote that it made sense to delegate the 
amount of testing to the probation officer.376  More importantly, the judge 
noted that, in the alternate, sentencing courts would set drug tests “sky-
high”377 to—as the majority itself conceded—”give the probation officer 
flexibility in supervising the offender” if that person has “serious predilec-
tions toward drug use,”378 as Stephens apparently did. 
 
 371. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 372. United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 373. See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
 374. See supra notes 272-285 and accompanying text. 
 375. Stephens, 424 F.3d at 887 (Clifton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 884 n.5 (majority opinion). 
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The facts in Stephens suggest that the probation officer used a strict re-
gimen of frequent drug testing on a defendant with a severe drug problem, 
a policy that met with initial success.379  Thereafter, however, Stephens re-
lapsed and went missing, prompting his officer to file a motion to revoke 
his supervised release.380 
These facts vividly illustrate the difficulties facing a judge sentencing a 
defendant with drug problems—a common condition for offenders.381  It is 
unclear from the record how many drug tests Stephens’ officer imposed 
upon him in total,382 but the task of setting the proper maximum number of 
drug tests would seem extremely difficult and arbitrary.  Moreover, it might 
lead to probation officers rationing their tests as they approach their judge-
imposed limit, to the detriment of an offender needing the tests as an in-
ducement to stay clean.  While the officer can file a petition with the court 
for a modification of the condition—in this instance, for more tests—doing 
so takes time and energy so that, in practice, it simply might not happen 
other than in pressing situations. 
One solution appears promising.  It might seem that the judge could 
simply set an extremely high number of drug tests and give the probation 
officer discretion to impose fewer than that number.  However, as the cases 
in Part II illustrate, that is precisely the scenario that the majority non-
delegation courts prohibit.  They do not allow judges to impose a condi-
tion—for example, participation in a drug treatment center—and then leave 
it to the probation officer to relieve the defendant from participating if he or 
she does not seem to need it after prison.383  Indeed, in Stephens, the major-
ity itself conceded that, under their rule, defendants with drug problems 
would indeed be subjected to more drug tests than they might necessarily 
need.384  The implication is that the judge may not allow the probation of-
ficer to carry out fewer tests than are set at sentencing within his or her dis-
cretion. 
Thus, prohibiting delegation does indeed invite385 the judge to make de-
cisions not based on the defendant’s post-incarceration needs, but based on 
 
 379. See supra Part II.A.2.c.i. 
 380. See supra Part II.A.2.c.i. 
 381. See supra note 133. 
 382. See Stephens, 424 F.3d 876. 
 383. United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2005), best illustrates this proposi-
tion. See supra Parts II.2.a-b. 
 384. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 385. United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 887 (9th Cir. 2005) (Clifton, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“Today’s decision simply invites sentencing courts to set a 
high maximum number of tests—the largest number of tests that might be required or 
sought by a probation officer.”). 
SCHRAA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
960 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
a best guess about the amount of lee-way a probation officer might require 
as he or she attempts to, for example, help a defendant kick a drug habit.  
Allowing delegation ends this needless and harmful game, in a manner that 
is consonant with Congress’ intent for supervised release. 
c. Rehabilitation 
Allowing delegation also treats conditions of release as rehabilitative 
measures, which, in theory at least, they are;386 prohibiting delegation treats 
them as punitive.  Again, Stephens best illustrates this point.  While Ste-
phens’ facts do not provide enough information to draw a firm conclusion 
about the probation officers’ methods or effectiveness, they do suggest that 
she used drug testing, not in a punitive manner, but as a rehabilitative tool 
to help Stephens overcome his addiction.  She did file for revocation of his 
supervised release, but only after he had relapsed and gone missing.387  
Moreover, she succeeded in getting Stephens to enter two intensive treat-
ment centers, at one of which he was, however briefly, successful.388 
The majority in Stephens, however, did not see the drug tests as rehabi-
litative tools, but described them as “criminal punishment.”389  That ap-
proach seems misguided.  It ignores evidence suggesting that Stephens’ 
probation officer needed the tests—and, arguably, the threat of revoca-
tion—to help him build a new life.  Treating conditions as punitive, thus, 
leads to a rule that divorces them from their purpose.  Focusing on form 
over substance, Stephens placed the formalistic goal of prohibiting delega-
tion above the trial judge’s attempts to prescribe a form of supervised re-
lease that would most benefit Stephens. 
In no case examined in Part II did a judge demonstrate any intention 
other than to help a defendant or demonstrate a belief that the conditions of 
supervised release were somehow punitive.  Allowing delegation thus ad-
vances supervised release’s rehabilitative goal in a small, but meaningful 
way. 
2. Critiques of Supervised Release 
Delegation cannot solve the many problems that critics believe are inhe-
rent in the supervised release scheme, as discussed in Part I.B.3.  But it 
does play a small part in ameliorating them. 
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 387. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
 388. See supra notes 274-80 and accompanying text. 
 389. Stephens, 424 F.3d at 883; see also supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
SCHRAA_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
2011] DELEGATIONAL DELUSIONS 961 
First, the evidence indicates that many, including the Justice Depart-
ment, Congress, and some federal district courts,390 believe that supervised 
release does not achieve its rehabilitative aims as well as it might.  But, as 
demonstrated in Part III.B.1.c directly above, delegation serves supervised 
release’s rehabilitative aims—and prohibiting delegation works against 
them.  In Stephens, allowing the probation officer some discretion to set the 
number of drug tests gave her more power to help Stephens overcome his 
addiction than she might have had if operating under a fixed limit.  Thus, 
delegation helps—albeit in a small way that does not compare with the am-
bitions of the Department of Justice’s research into reentry systems, of the 
federal district courts’ reentry courts, or of Congress’ recent Second 
Chance Act—to make supervised release more rehabilitative than it other-
wise might be. 
Second, because supervised release so frequently results in revocation, 
sending prisoners back to prison, which is costly, the system is widely con-
sidered excessively expensive.391  As the cases in Part II show, however, 
delegation tends to reduce the number of conditions by which a defendant 
must abide.  A system without delegation imposes conditions on defendants 
that they may not actually need.  For example, had Bowman’s case392 come 
up in a majority jurisdiction, the court would likely have imposed the pro-
hibition from seeing his son and grandson unsupervised upon him—rather 
than allowing his probation officer to relieve him from that condition 
should she feel that he posed no threat.  Presumably, a greater number of 
conditions of release means a greater number of violations and, thus, more 
costly revocations.  Thus, delegation likely keeps costs lower than they 
otherwise might be. 
CONCLUSION 
The split over delegation pits appellate courts against trial judges, puni-
tive specters against rehabilitative hopes, and righteous theory against ac-
tual facts.  In the circuit courts today, reality is losing the battle to a blin-
kered vision of the Constitution.  The Supreme Court should weigh in on 
the side of the trial courts, of the defendants whose rights animate Article 
III, and of common sense.  Delegation, as practiced in the context of super-
vised release, is perfectly appropriate.  Upon examination, it is not the lazy 
act of a judge abandoning a defendant to the unfettered caprices of the Pro-
bation Office.  It merely brings a small measure of support to what is, by all 
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accounts, a broken reentry system inadequately serving former convicts.  
Certainly, it is far from being the separation of powers bogeyman its appel-
late court adversaries take pride in slaying. 
